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Abstract
Profitably balancing demand and supply is a continuous challenge for companies under changing market conditions, and the potential benefit of collaboration between
supply chain partners cannot be overlooked by any firm who strives to succeed. One
of the key elements to successful collaboration is sharing of forecast information between supply chain partners. However, when supply shortage is expected, buyers
may inflate order quantities and/or order forecasts to secure sufficient supply. An
important question that arises is how the supplier should allocate inventory to customers when shortage exists. Literature shows that certain allocation policies can
reduce buyers’ order inflation behavior. However, this has not yet been empirically
shown for order forecast inflation behavior, nor incorporating the behavioral aspects
of decision makers. In this dissertation, through behavioral experiments using a supply chain simulation game, we investigate the impact of different capacity allocation
mechanisms and information disclosures of a supplier on buyers’ forecast sharing and
ordering behavior.
We first investigate the buyers’ order forecast sharing behavior in a single-suppliertwo-buyer supply chain. Our behavioral study shows that forecast-accuracy based
allocation, where the supplier allocates more capacity to the buyer with better forecast accuracy, can significantly improve order forecast accuracy relative to uniform
allocation, where the supplier equally allocates capacity to the buyers. Under both
policies, particularly uniform allocation, the order forecast accuracy is improved with
the supplier’s information disclosure on the policy. Next, we focus on buyers’ ordering behavior, and formulate a single-supplier-single-buyer base-stock inventory

vi

model under constrained supply. We validate our analytical results through numerical simulation, which is then extended to the single-supplier-two-buyer case. We next
compare the buyers’ optimal decisions from the simulation with the actual decisions
in our behavioral study, and find that buyers in the experiment show a significantly
lower profit performance ranging from 0.8% to 14.1%. Using structural estimation
modeling techniques, we estimate the buyers’ perceived overage/underage cost ratios
from the experiment, and conclude by conducting a detailed analysis on the factors
that affect buyers’ ordering decisions.
In addition to academic contributions, our results provide insights for practitioners
to understand buyers’ strategic behavior and help with designing capacity allocation
strategies.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Many companies continuously strive to improve their value streams to better fulfill
their customers’ demand as market conditions change. The semiconductor industry,
a prototype of the high-tech industry, especially experiences cyclical changes arising
from product innovation and technological advancement, as well as changing customer
needs. Profitably balancing demand and supply is an ongoing challenge for companies
under such circumstances, and the potential benefit of collaboration between supply
chain partners could be hardly overlooked by any firm who strives to succeed.
One of the key elements to a successful collaboration is the sharing of forecast
information between supply chain partners. Buyers often share their demand forecasts
(Mishra et al., 2009) and/or order forecasts (also referred to as “soft orders”) (Cohen
et al., 2003) with their supplier. Sharing demand forecast information between supply
chain partners would benefit the supplier (Mishra et al., 2009), while sharing order
forecast with the supplier may also result in a reduced order variability and the
bullwhip effect, even more than sharing demand forecasts (Chen and Lee, 2009).
However, buyers may update their soft orders many times until the firm order date,
and due to this “forecast volatility” (Terwiesch et al., 2005), the supplier faces the risk
of cancellation or holding costs, while the buyers face the risk of delay costs (Cohen
et al., 2003).
In such collaborative efforts, reasonably aligning incentives between supply chain
partners is essential; otherwise, each firm would act in its own best interest, and
the shared information would not be credible. For example, when supply shortage
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is expected, buyers tend to inflate their orders to secure sufficient supply (Cachon
and Lariviere, 1999a). Moreover, as soft orders reveal the intention of purchase and
are usually without any contractual obligation, buyers may also submit inflated order
forecasts to the supplier. Recognizing buyers’ tendency of forecast inflation, the supplier may discount or even ignore the shared forecasts, which may result in a further
forecast inflation behavior from the buyers (Terwiesch et al., 2005). As a result, no
credible forecast sharing would exist between the supply chain partners. High-tech
and capital-intensive industries, such as semiconductor and aerospace manufacturing,
particularly suffer from this (Özer et al., 2011), due to short product life cycles, heavy
competition, and the high pressures of price and cost. While semiconductor equipment buyers expect a high degree of responsiveness, the high value and customized
nature of such equipment make it risky for the supplier to start production early, or
even keep finished goods inventory.
Another important issue is how the supplier should allocate the capacity to each
buyer in times of shortage (Krishnan et al., 2007). Cachon and Lariviere (1999a)
analytically show that certain allocation mechanisms can induce or reduce buyers’
tendency to submit orders higher than optimal or realistic ordering levels to compete
for scarce inventory with other buyers. For instance, the proportional allocation policy, where the supplier allocates capacity proportional to each buyer’s order quantity,
is an “order-inflating” mechanism (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999b), while the uniform
allocation policy, where the supplier equally divides and allocates the available capacity to each buyer, is a “truth-inducing” mechanism in that it mitigates orderinflation behavior. However, the effect of capacity allocation mechanisms on buyers’
order-forecast sharing behavior has not yet been investigated in the literature.
In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of different capacity allocation
mechanisms on buyers’ forecast sharing and ordering behavior. In Chapter 2, we
focus on the buyers’ order forecast sharing behavior through behavioral experiments
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using a supply chain simulation game. Theoretical operations management (OM)
research assumes that players in the supply chain are fully rational, making optimal
decisions toward a certain goal. However, many behavioral OM papers have shown
that due to behavioral aspects such as decision biases, the decision makers often
make suboptimal decisions, even under a simple single-period newsvendor setting
(Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bolton and Katok, 2008). In this research, we investigate the impact of supplier’s capacity allocation mechanisms on the order forecast
sharing behavior of human buyers in a multi-period setting. To collect data for our
study, we conducted behavioral experiments by utilizing a computerized supply-chain
simulation game. The game is developed in partnership with a large semiconductor
manufacturer, and designed to model a two-stage supply chain with realistic features
such as inventory/backlog carryover across multiple periods, buyers’ competition for
the scarce capacity of their supplier, (long) manufacturing lead times, and stochastic
consumer demand. In our game setting, the supplier is computerized, while the buyers are played by human subjects. Our behavioral study shows that forecast-accuracy
based allocation, where the supplier allocates more capacity to the buyer with better
forecast accuracy, can significantly improve order forecast accuracy relative to uniform allocation, where the supplier equally allocates capacity to the buyers. Under
both policies, particularly uniform allocation, the order forecast accuracy is improved
with the supplier’s information disclosure on the policy.
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, we focus on the buyers’ ordering behavior under
uniform allocation using a theoretical framework. We characterize a buyer’s optimal
base stock level in a two-stage supply chain using analytical and numerical simulation
approaches. We first present a single-buyer base-stock inventory model with a supplier
that provides 100% fill rate and then one that provides less than 100% fill rate. We
validate our results through numerical simulation for both uniformly and normally
distributed consumer demand. We then utilize a numerical simulation approach for
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the two-buyer case, where the supplier allocates inventory equally between the two
buyers if the orders exceed available inventory, for both uniformly and normally
distributed consumer demand.
In Chapter 4, we empirically investigate buyers’ ordering decisions when inventory
rationing exists, under uniform allocation policy with/without information disclosure
from the supplier about the allocation policy. To the best of our knowledge, the
impact of uniform allocation mechanism and its information disclosure on buyers’
order inflation behavior has not been empirically shown, particularly using a behavioral framework. We first compare the theoretical benchmark results obtained from
simulation in Chapter 3 with the observed ordering decisions from our behavioral
study. We find that the profit performances of buyers are significantly lower than
the theoretical benchmark in the range of 0.8% to 14.1%. Consistent with the findings in the behavioral OM literature (Sterman, 1989), our analysis shows that buyers
are prone to make suboptimal ordering decisions, indicating that buyers may not be
fully rational. To better understand the nature of buyers’ ordering behavior, we use
a structural estimation technique to estimate the buyers’ perceived cost ratio (i.e.,
ratio between inventory holding and backlogging costs) and compare it against the
true cost parameter ratio. We also investigate what factors affect buyers’ ordering
decisions and find through maximum likelihood estimation that buyers ignore the
supply line regardless of the information disclosure on the allocation policy.
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of findings, limitations, and future research
directions.
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Chapter 2
Investigating the Effect of Capacity
Allocation Policies on Buyers’ Forecast
Sharing Behavior in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
2.1

Introduction

One of the key elements of a successful supply chain collaboration scheme is the
sharing of forecast information between supply chain partners. In many industries,
buyers (who may sell to end consumers or other buyers) often submit forecasts for
future orders to their supplier to help with capacity planning. Sharing order forecasts
(also referred to as “soft orders”) with the supplier can also help with reducing the
order variability and the bullwhip effect, even more than sharing demand forecasts
(Chen and Lee, 2009). However, buyers may update the soft order multiple times until
the firm order is placed, and as a result of this “forecast volatility” (Terwiesch et al.,
2005), the supplier takes the risk of cancellation or holding costs, while the buyers take
the risk of the delay costs (Cohen et al., 2003). Since soft orders represent the intent
of purchasing and are often not legally binding, buyers tend to submit inflated order
forecasts to secure capacity from their supplier. The supplier, knowing this forecast
inflation behavior of the buyers, may discount or even ignore the forecasts received,
leading to lower service levels and longer delivery times, which may further drive
the buyers to inflate their forecasts (Terwiesch et al., 2005). The result is virtually
no sharing of reliable forecast information between the parties. Capital-intensive
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industries, such as semiconductor and aerospace manufacturing, particularly suffer
from this (Özer et al., 2011). While buyers of semiconductor equipment expect a high
degree of responsiveness, the high value and customized nature of such equipment
make it risky for the equipment supplier to start production early, or even keep
finished goods inventory. Victims of inflated forecasts include the networking giant
Cisco Systems who had to write off $2.2 billion worth of inventory in 2001 due to its
failure to recognize duplicate orders from its customers (Bloomberg, 2002).
An important issue is how the supplier should allocate his capacity when the total
order quantity from buyers exceeds the available capacity (Krishnan et al., 2007).
Certain allocation policies can motivate a buyer to submit orders higher than their
optimal or realistic levels so as to compete with other buyers for scarce inventory
(Cachon and Lariviere, 1999a). For example, in some settings, the uniform allocation
policy, where the supplier divides the available capacity equally among the buyers,
is a “truth-inducing” mechanism, while the proportional allocation policy, where the
supplier allocates capacity proportional to a buyer’s order, is an “order-inflating”
mechanism (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999b). The risk of an order-inflating mechanism
can be two-fold. First, it may result in uneven allocation of inventory that is far
from optimal for the supply chain. Second, the supplier may take the higher-thanusual orders from the buyers as a signal for increasing demand, which could lead to
over-building of capacity.
In this chapter, our goal is to understand the endogeneity between a supplier’s capacity allocation policy and the buyers’ order forecast accuracy. Note that “forecast”
refers to the soft orders from buyers in our setting and not the buyers’ demand forecasts. Accordingly, “forecast accuracy” refers to the accuracy of the order forecasts,
i.e., the discrepancy between the soft orders and the firm order. Most theoretical and
empirical studies have investigated the effect of capacity allocation policies on order
inflation behavior but not the related effect on order forecasting behavior, which is

6

our core research question in this chapter. Krishnan et al. (2007) investigate this
question with an empirical study using a large panel dataset of the forecasting and
order transactions from a large semiconductor manufacturer and find that when buyers observe a signal of rationing, order forecast volatility (“churn”) that the supplier
faces increases. Our investigation of this phenomenon is using a behavioral framework. Behavioral operations management (OM) has gained significant interest from
researchers over the last decade (Gino and Pisano, 2008). Traditionally, most analytical papers in OM assume that decision makers are fully rational, optimizing decisions
toward a single monetary or service-oriented goal. However, as shown by many behavioral OM papers, decision biases may cause individuals to deviate from the optimal,
even under a simple setting such as the single period ordering of a newsvendor (e.g.,
Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bolton and Katok, 2008). Moreover, recent behavioral
OM papers have shown that demand forecasting accuracy can be directly impacted
by individual differences and judgment biases (Kremer et al., 2011; Moritz et al.,
2014; Kremer et al., 2016). In this chapter, we investigate the effect of capacity allocation policies on human behavior for order forecasting decisions in a multi-period
setting, utilizing a computerized simulation game developed in partnership with a
large semiconductor manufacturer. The game is designed to model a supply chain
with realistic features such as inventory/backlog carryover across multiple periods,
buyers competing for the scarce inventory of their supplier, (long) manufacturing
lead-times, and stochastic consumer demand.
To understand the effect of capacity allocation on order forecast accuracy, we utilize two policies: (1) We designate the uniform allocation policy (UNI) as the control
scenario. (2) We propose the “forecast accuracy based allocation policy (FCT),”
where the supplier allocates (proportionally) more inventory to the buyer with the
better order forecast accuracy in case of shortage. Most game theoretical papers on
capacity allocation assume that buyers are fully aware of the supplier’s allocation pol-
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icy. However, in practice, suppliers may not entirely disclose their allocation policies
to their customers (Krishnan et al., 2007), affecting customers’ behavior. We compare
buyers’ order forecast accuracy under both policies with and without communication
from their supplier about the policy.
In summary, our goal is to address the following questions:
1. How do buyers’ order forecasting behavior change with the allocation policy of
their supplier?
2. Can a forecast-accuracy based allocation policy reduce buyers’ order forecast
inflation?
3. Does communicating the allocation policy to buyers affect their order forecasting behavior?
It is not straightforward to answer the above questions analytically, and it could
be quite costly, or even infeasible, for companies to test the impact of different allocation policies in a real-world setting. Thus, we use the lab environment as a “test bed”
to investigate our proposed allocation policy and provide managerial insights. Forecast sharing issues within supply chains have been studied through theoretical and
empirical studies, while there are only a few behavioral studies (e.g., Özer et al., 2011;
Hyndman et al., 2013; Scheele et al., 2014), which primarily investigate demand forecast sharing. Similarly, capacity allocation policies have been studied theoretically,
while behavioral studies are limited and focus on proportional allocation policies with
one-shot games (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Chen and Zhao, 2015; Cui and Zhang, 2017).
We contribute to the behavioral OM literature by analyzing the effect of capacity
allocation policies on buyers’ order forecast accuracy in a multi-period setting with
inventory carryover. We reward better forecast accuracy as in Scheele et al. (2014)
but instead of a monetary incentive, we use a more favorable capacity allocation in
case of supply shortage. Unlike many existing behavioral OM studies, which test
8

a known or derived theoretical result in the lab, our approach is entirely empirical
due to the lack of theoretical results in this complicated practice-driven framework.
Thus, our goal is to motivate future analytical and empirical studies in this area while
providing insights for practitioners.
Our experimental findings suggest that rewarding forecast accuracy in allocating
inventory can lead to improved order forecast accuracy by reducing order forecast
inflation and bias. When the supplier communicates this policy to the buyers, even
the bullwhip effect may be reduced. While UNI has been suggested in analytical
studies as a truth-inducing mechanism for orders (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999b), we
find that this may not be the case for order forecasts as we observe the highest forecast
inflation and error under this setting if there is no communication. Interestingly, FCT
reduces order forecast inflation compared to UNI even without communication.

2.2

Supply Chain Simulation Game Overview

Our game framework is given in Figure 2.1. There is a single supplier (e.g., a computer
chip manufacturer) selling a single product to two buyers (e.g., OEMs or distributors).
A buyer (she) receives the product from the supplier (he), and sells it to the consumers
(possibly after processing and converting it into finished goods). The buyers do not
compete in the end market. The supplier has a production lead time, L, that causes a
delay between the time that production starts and the time that the product is ready
to be shipped to the buyers (L = 4 periods in the game). The time it takes to ship
the product from the supplier to the buyers and from the buyers to the consumers is
short relative to the supplier’s production lead time, and assumed to be zero.
The game is played in discrete periods. In each period, buyers place their orders
with the supplier and submit forecasts for future orders, while the supplier fulfills
received orders (subject to available inventory and allocation policy) and makes production decisions. The forecast horizon (the number of periods into the future for
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demand
End Customers
Demand ~ N(200, 402)

Buyer 1
shipment
(zero lead‐time)

Supplier
4 period production
lead‐time

demand
End Customers
Demand ~ N(200, 402)

Buyer 2
shipment
(zero lead‐time)

Figure 2.1: Simulation Game Framework
which the buyers provide order forecasts to the supplier) is equal to the production
lead time of the supplier. Order forecasts (soft orders) are intended to give the supplier a rough estimate of future orders and can be changed until the firm order is
placed. Both the supplier and the buyer have access to the order forecasts and the
orders exchanged between the two, so that the order forecast accuracy is common
knowledge to both parties. In this game, the role of the supplier is played by the
computer with decisions automated through algorithms, while the two buyers are
played by human subjects.
The goal for both the supplier and the buyers is to maximize their own profit,
which is calculated as the sales revenue from shipping products to one’s customers minus the procurement/production cost proportional to the units received/produced and
the inventory holding cost or the backlogging cost for unsatisfied demand. Unit selling price and procurement/inventory/backlog cost parameters are chosen according to
our semiconductor manufacturer partner’s recommendations, and are given in Table
2.1. The consumer demand for both buyers is independent and normally distributed
2
with the same mean and standard deviation (∼ N (µD , σD
); µD = 200, σD = 40),

which is common knowledge to the buyers. Both inventory and backlog units are
carried over to the next period.
At the beginning of the game (in period 0), buyers are asked to submit initial
order forecasts for the first four periods but there is no order placement. Then, the
10

Table 2.1: Revenue/Cost Parameters
Parameter
Unit Revenue (Selling Price), p
Unit Production/Procurement Cost, c
Unit Inventory Holding Cost, h
Unit Backlogging Cost, b

Supplier
$1
$0.5
$0.05
$0.15

Buyers
$2
$1
$0.15
$0.45

clock advances to period 1 and in each period, the following events take place (see
Figure 2.2):
1. Each buyer submits an order to the supplier asking for a certain number of
units to be delivered in that period. Buyers also submit order forecasts for the
next four periods.
2. The supplier receives the orders and forecasts, and decides on the number of
units to be shipped to each buyer and the production quantity for the current
period. If he does not have enough inventory to fulfill every buyer’s order, some
orders will be backlogged and fulfilled in future periods. The backlogged orders
are referred to as the “on-order” quantity.
3. Buyers receive the shipments from the supplier immediately, and inventories
are replenished.
4. Consumer demand for each buyer occurs, and is filled immediately from inventory. If demand exceeds available inventory, the buyer backlogs the demand
and fulfills it in future periods.
5. Profit is calculated for the current period, and the period ends.
The software for the game is coded in C++. It displays various information to help
the players with the decision-making process, including performance metrics (e.g.,
the average per period profit, supplier fill rate and buyer service level, exponentially
smoothed forecast accuracy) and system state information (received shipment from
11

the supplier, realized consumer demand in the previous period, on-order quantity,
remaining on-hand inventory or backlog carried over from the previous period). We
present all game screens with detailed descriptions in Appendix A.5. Note that the
service level we refer to for both the supplier and buyers is “Type 2 Service Level,”
or fill rate, i.e., the fraction of demand that is satisfied from inventory, which is
commonly used in practice. To differentiate the service level for the supplier and the
buyer within the game, we refer to the supplier’s service level as fill rate (F L) and
the buyer’s service level as service level (SL).
1. Submit order &
forecasts

BUYERS

SUPPLIER

3. Receive
shipment

4. Fulfill
demand

5. Calculate
profit
Time

2. Set inventory allocations
& production quantity

(Repeat)

Note. All grey boxes are automated within the game.
Figure 2.2: Sequence of Events in Each Period of the Game
Table 2.2 describes the notation for the key variables in this chapter. Next, we
describe the supplier’s production and allocation algorithms.

2.2.1

Supplier’s Production Algorithm

The supplier’s production decision in each period is determined by a base-stock policy.
After receiving buyers’ orders, the supplier chooses a production quantity to raise his
inventory position to the target base stock level. The supplier then decides on the
shipment quantities, given his finished goods inventory and the inventory allocation
policy (see Section 2.2.2). We use a target service level of β for the supplier’s base
stock level. We assume that backlogs are always satisfied first in a given period. The
per period service level is then calculated as (1 −

Bit
)
Dit

P

N
for buyer i and (1 − Pi Oitit )
i

for the supplier. If the supplier knows that the consumer demand for the buyers per
2
period is i.i.d. normal with N (µD , σD
), the expected backorder for the supplier is
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Table 2.2: Key Variables

Notation

Definition

Dit

Consumer demand realized by buyer i in period t, i = 1, ..., m

Oit

Order quantity placed by buyer i at the beginning of period t, i = 1, ..., m

Rit

Received shipment by buyer i in period t, i = 1, ..., m

Iit :

On-hand inventory of buyer i at the end of period t, i = 1, ..., m
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Bit :

Backlog of buyer i at the end of period t, i = 1, ..., m

Nit :

On-order quantity that the supplier owes to buyer i at the end of period t, i = 1, ..., m

SBi :

Base stock level of buyer i, i = 1, ..., m

Fitl

Forecast quantity submitted by buyer i in period t for l periods ahead,
l = 1, ..., L, i = 1, ..., m

πit

Profit of buyer i in period t, i = 1, ..., m

ILt :

Inventory level of the supplier at the beginning of period t

IPt :

Inventory position of the supplier in period t

S:
F GIt :
W IPtl :
Pt :

Base stock level of the supplier
Finished goods inventory of the supplier at the end of period t
Work-in-process inventory of the supplier to be available at the end of period t + l, l = 1...L − 1
Production quantity of the supplier initiated in period t after receiving buyer orders

given by:
L(z) = (1 − β)

µD · m
√
σD m · L

where L(z) is the standard normal loss function, z is the safety factor (safety inventory
in terms of the number of standard deviations), and m is the number of buyers. Note
that the nominator of the equation is the expected demand in one period only, while
the denominator is the standard deviation of demand over lead-time.1 The base stock
√
level for the supplier is then given by S = µD · m · L + z · σD · m · L. Let inventory
level (ILt ) denote the on-hand inventory minus the backorders at the beginning of a
period. The inventory position (IPt ) is given by the inventory level plus the on-order
inventory, while the amount of production needed (following the base stock policy)
is ([x]+ = max{0, x}):
Pt = [S − (IPt −

X

Oit )]+

i

where IPt = ILt +

X

and

W IPt−1,l

ILt = F GIt−1 −

X

Ni,t−1

i

l

At the end of period t, after shipments are sent to the buyers, the inventory components are updated as:
F GIt = (F GIt−1 −

X

Rit ) + W IPt−1,1 ;

W IPt,l−1 = W IPt−1,l , for l = 2, 3

i

W IPt,3 = Pt ;

Ni,t = max{Ni,t−1 + Oit − Rit , 0}, for i = 1, 2

Using a target service level of β = 85% in the game, we obtain the base stock
√
level as S = 200 · 2 · 4 + (−0.24) · 40 · 2 · 4=1572. In a preliminary study, we tested
low, medium, and high service levels, and found the highest order forecast inflation in
the “medium” service level setting. When the service level is too high or too low, the
supplier either consistently delivers orders without any delay or consistently carries
a backlog. In either case, buyers learn what to expect from the supplier quickly.
1

For a detailed explanation, see Cachon, G.P., C. Terwiesch. 2013. Matching supply with
demand: An introduction to operations management. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY
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However, when the supplier’s service level is medium, his ability to fulfill orders is
not consistent, which motivate buyers for strategic behavior. Therefore, we conducted
all experiments in this study using the medium service level.
To initialize the system with starting inventory so that the buyers do not have to
wait for L = 4 periods until the first production batch is available for meeting their
orders, we use: F GI0 = 454, W IP01 = W IP02 = W IP03 = 390. These values help
the system start with a higher service level than implied by the base stock level so as to
avoid the cumulative effects of initial inventory shortages on the rest of the game. In
particular, a base stock policy could have been optimal for the buyers in the absence of
inventory rationing (a buyer’s order is not guaranteed to be fully met under a capacity
allocation policy). Let SB denote the base stock level for the buyers. Note that buyers
need to make a decision before consumer demand is realized. Thus, in period 1, before
any demand realizations are observed, we would expect a “rational” buyer to set her
base stock level according to the target in-stock probability given by the critical ratio
of the newsvendor model: P (Demand ≤ SB ) =

b
.
h+b

From Table 2.1, the critical ratio

for buyers is 75%, which corresponds to a safety factor of 0.674 from the standard
normal distribution, and a base stock level of 200 + 40 · 0.674 ' 227.2 Thus, rather
than equally distributing the supplier’s base stock level over four periods of lead-time,
we use a higher initial on-hand inventory of (2)·(227) = 454, which corresponds to the
sum of the buyers’ optimal inventory positions in period 1. This ensures that if buyers
select their initial orders according to the target in-stock probability defined above,
the supplier can fully meet these orders without any backlog. Supplier’s inventory
position in period 1 then becomes 1624, which implies P1 =
and Pt =

P

i

P

i

Oi1 − (1624 − 1572)

Oit for t = 2, ..., T . That is, the production quantity is equal to the sum

of orders in each period after period 1. This is limited by the maximum production
2

Since a buyer receives an order (constrained by the supplier’s available inventory) within the
same period before demand is realized, we use a lead-time of one for the buyer.

15

quantity allowed, which is set to 1000 in the game.
Note that the supplier’s base stock level is independent of the order forecasts
submitted by the buyers in each period. While buyers may submit these forecasts to
help the supplier with capacity planning, we are interested in learning the relationship
between capacity allocation and order forecast accuracy. If both capacity allocation
and production were dependent on the forecasts submitted by the buyers, it would
be hard to understand whether the buyer behavior was a result of the supplier’s
production policy or allocation policy. Moreover, in practice, knowing the tendency
of the buyer to inflate forecasts, the supplier may ignore the forecasts received for
planning production (Terwiesch et al., 2005). Thus, we make only the allocation
policy (in case of FCT) to be dependent on forecasts, and assume that the supplier
has knowledge of the consumer demand distribution for setting his base stock level.

2.2.2

Supplier’s Allocation Algorithms

In a given period, after the supplier decides on the production quantity, he makes
a decision on the amount to ship to each buyer. If the buyers’ total order amount
is less than the available finished goods inventory, the supplier fully satisfies both
orders. Otherwise, he chooses the shipment quantity for each buyer based on the
implemented allocation policy. The general algorithm for allocation policies is given
below (we drop the t subscript from the variables, since this algorithm is executed
for every t). Given the available supply at the beginning of period t (F GIt−1 ), the
set of buyers (M ), and the orders submitted by the buyers (Oit , i = 1, ..., m), the
supplier allocates inventory such that no buyer is given more than what they asked
for (Rit ≤ Oit ) and no inventory is left unless every buyer’s order is fulfilled, while
considering each buyer’s “worthiness” to claim the inventory (scorei ), which depends
on the type of policy. Note that if there is any outstanding backlog to either of the
buyers, this algorithm is first executed for the backlogs, replacing Oi with Ni . After
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all backlogs are cleared, the algorithm is executed for the current period orders if
there is any inventory left, replacing F GI with F GI −

P

i

Ni . The total shipment to

each buyer is then the sum of the two output quantities.
Algorithm 1 General Algorithm for Allocation Policies
Input: Order (Oi ) and worthiness (scorei ) of each buyer (i ∈ M ); available supply
(F GI)
Output: Shipment quantity to each buyer (Ri , i ∈ M )
Initialization: Set C ← F GI; oi ← Oi ; M 0 ← M ; Ri ← 0
while C > 0 and M 0 not empty do
Set totalship ← 0
for i ∈ M 0 do
i
Compute allocation of buyer i: ai ← C · Pscore
score
j

j∈M 0

Assign Ri ← Ri + min{ai , oi } to buyer i
Set totalship ← totalship + Ri
Compute the remaining demand for buyer i: oi ← oi − Ri
if oi = 0 then
Remove buyer i from set M 0 : M 0 ← M 0 \ i.
end if
end for
Update the remaining inventory: C ← C − totalship
end while

We calculate scorei , which depends on the type of allocation policy, as follows:
(i) Uniform Allocation Policy (UNI): The supplier equally distributes available
inventory among buyers with positive remaining demand.
scorei = 1 for i = 1, ..., m
(ii) Forecast Accuracy Based Allocation Policy (FCT): The supplier weights
each order by the buyer’s exponentially smoothed forecast accuracy (F Ait ) and
proportionately distributes available inventory among buyers with positive remaining demand.
scoreit = F Ait · Oit for i = 1, ..., m
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Forecast accuracy is based on the discrepancy between the firm order the buyer
places for a given period (Oit ) and the forecasts (soft orders) she submits prior to
the firm order (Fi,t−l,l , l = 1, ..., L). We calculate the forecast accuracy as one minus
the absolute forecast error divided by the larger of the order or forecast, to keep the
metric between 0 and 1 and balance the amount of under- and over-forecasting. Let
f ait be the forecast accuracy of buyer i in period t, exponentially smoothed based on
the forecasts submitted for period t (t forecasts to be submitted until t = L − 1, and
L forecasts after t = L). The overall forecast accuracy for buyer i (F Ait ) as of period
t is:
F Ait ← α · f ai1 + (1 − α) · f ai0

for t = 1

F Ait ← α · f ait + (1 − α) · F Ai,t−1

for t = 2, ..., T

Thus, we calculate the per period forecast accuracy, f ait , by exponentially smoothing
the accuracy across lead-time, and the overall forecast accuracy, F Ait , by exponentially smoothing the per period forecast accuracy across periods. We use the same
smoothing constant, α = 0.3, for both types of smoothing in the game. We set the
initial forecast accuracy of buyers to fi0 = 1, assuming that each player is an honest
forecaster at the beginning of the game. To calculate the per period forecast accuracy,
we construct a smoothing weight matrix W, where row j ∈ {1, 2, 3} represents the
weight vector Wj for period t = j, and row j = 4 represents t ≥ 4. Wjk refers to the
element in row j and column k of the matrix:


W=























α
(1 − α)α

α

(1 − α)2 α

(1 − α)α

α

(1 − α)3 α

(1 − α)2 α

(1 − α)α
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α





















The forecast accuracy of each individual forecast, f ali,t,t−l is calculated as:
f ali,t,t−l

[Fi,t−l,l − Oit ]+ [Oit − Fi,t−l,l ]+
+
=1−
Fi,t−l,l
Oit

!

l = 1, ..., 4; t = 1, ..., T ; l ≤ t

where [x]+ = max{0, x}. We then construct the accuracy vector FALit for buyer i in
period t as follows:

FALit =





























f ali,t,t−1

for t = 1








f ali,t,t−2

f ali,t,t−1

for t = 2






























f ali,t,t−3

f ali,t,t−2

f ali,t,t−1




for t = 3




f ali,t,t−4

f ali,t,t−3

f ali,t,t−2

f ali,t,t−1



for t ≥ 4

Thus, we obtain f ait as:

f ait =



Wt · FALTit



P



k Wtk









W4 · FALTit


 P

k

W4k

for t = 1, 2, 3

for t ≥ 4

A proportional allocation policy may encourage order inflation from buyers to secure capacity (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999a,b), and can be expected to have a similar
effect on order forecasts. Although the mechanism is proportional in principle under
FCT, when the two buyers’ forecast accuracies differ, then the better forecaster will
be rewarded with a higher service level from the supplier. Thus, our expectation with
this policy is that it should alleviate the order forecast inflation behavior and motivate
the buyers to improve their forecast accuracy. Since the supplier uses a base-stock
production policy in our setting, an improvement in the buyers’ forecast accuracy
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will not improve the supplier’s overall service level, i.e., if both buyers improve their
forecast accuracy to the same level, neither of them will gain an advantage (FCT
will then be equivalent to a classical proportional allocation policy).
We can see the implications of the allocation policy on supplier’s service levels
with an example in Table 2.3. In this example, the supplier has a supply of 200 units
(F GI = 200). Buyer 1 submits an order of 100 units (low type) and Buyer 2 submits
an order of 150 units (high type). Since both orders cannot be fully satisfied given
the available inventory, the chosen allocation policy and the forecast accuracy of each
buyer in case of FCT will affect how many units each buyer receives. Under UNI,
each buyer gets an equal allocation of inventory, so while Buyer 1 observes 100% fill
rate, Buyer 2 observes 67%. If the supplier switches to FCT and both buyers have
100% forecast accuracy (Case I), inventory is distributed in proportion to the orders
placed, which benefits the high type buyer. Namely, the fill rate to Buyer 1 drops to
80%, while that to Buyer 2 increases to 80%. However, if Buyer 1 has better forecast
accuracy (Case II), the fill rate to Buyer 1 increases to 90% while that to Buyer 2
decreases to 73%. On the other hand, if the low type buyer also has the worse forecast
accuracy (Case III), the penalty in service level is even worse, especially compared
to UNI. Note that this example reflects the calculations in one period only. While
scorei will stay constant for UNI across all periods, it will change for FCT since
F Ai is updated in each period.
Table 2.3: Allocation Policy Example
UNI

FCT
I
II
III
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 1 Buyer 2
Oi
100
150
100
150
100
150
100
150
F Ai
1
1
1
0.8
0.8
1
scorei
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.45
0.55
0.35
0.65
Ri
100
100
80
120
90
110
70
130
Ni
0
50
20
30
10
40
30
20
f ill_ratei 100%
67%
80%
80%
90%
73%
70%
87%
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2.3

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

We refer the reader to Bendoly et al. (2006) and Katok (2011) for comprehensive
reviews on behavioral studies in OM. This chapter falls under three broad streams
of research: Forecast sharing, capacity allocation and the bullwhip effect. We next
review the papers in each stream and introduce our hypotheses.

2.3.1

Forecast Sharing

Forecast sharing has been studied in various contexts. In a one-buyer one-supplier
setting, standard game theory dictates that the only Nash equilibrium (NE) in a
one-shot game is uninformative, i.e., the buyer does not share her forecast truthfully
and the supplier does not use the reported forecast in determining capacity. Most
theoretical studies propose contracts and sharing formats to induce truthful demand
forecast sharing (Cachon and Lariviere, 2001; Özer and Wei, 2006; Mishra et al.,
2009; Taylor and Xiao, 2010; Amornpetchkul et al., 2015; Shamir and Shin, 2016;
Chen et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016). For truthful order forecast sharing, DurangoCohen and Yano (2006, 2011) propose forecast-commitment contracts, which require
commitments by both the buyer and supplier to purchase/deliver a certain fraction
of the submitted forecasts, while Baruah et al. (2016) propose a soft order revision
mechanism for the buyer, where she needs to pay an upfront deposit for the soft
order, with or without access to the supplier’s inventory position information.
Truthful sharing of demand forecasts can emerge as a result of the trust between
supply chain partners, which is shown analytically as an equilibrium in an infinitely
repeated game by Ren et al. (2010), with behavioral studies by Özer et al. (2011,
2014), and with numerical simulation by Ebrahim-Khanjari et al. (2012). Hyndman
et al. (2013) show with a behavioral study that truthful demand forecast sharing can
help supply chain partners coordinate capacity decisions. They also examine the effect
of pre-play communication, and find that even if the information is not fully truthful,
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communication can act as a coordinating mechanisms and be effective in increasing
profits. Their results (focusing on demand forecasts) are in line with our findings
(focusing on order forecasts) in that communication of a supplier’s allocation policy
to his buyers can effectively improve the forecast accuracy of the buyers. Scheele et al.
(2014) add to these findings with a behavioral study that a targeted use of penalties
on demand forecast inaccuracies, which penalize over-forecasting more than underforecasting, can further motivate a buyer to share credible forecasts and eliminate
forecast distortions.
We contribute to the behavioral OM literature in forecast sharing by analyzing the
effect of capacity allocation policies on buyers’ order forecast accuracy. We reward
better forecast accuracy as in Scheele et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2016) but instead
of a monetary incentive/penalty, we propose a more favorable capacity allocation
policy (FCT) in case of supply shortage. Moreover, all of the above literature employ
one-shot or repeated game settings, while we analyze a multi-period setting with
inventory carryover across periods. Theoretical analysis of such a framework is quite
difficult; hence, we use the lab environment to draw insights into the effectiveness of
the proposed allocation mechanism in reducing order forecast inflation.
In our analysis, we use four metrics to measure order forecast accuracy and understand a buyer’s forecasting behavior:
• Mean Forecast Error: The positive or negative bias in order forecasts.
Pn

m_f et :=

l=1 (Fi,t−l,l

n

− Oit )

,

n = t for t < L; n = L for t ≥ L

• Mean Absolute Forecast Error: The positive and negative order forecast
errors weighted equally.
Pn

ma_f et :=

l=1

|Fi,t−l,l − Oit |
,
n
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n = t for t < L; n = L for t ≥ L

• Mean Forecast Inflation: The positive order forecast error.
Pn

m_inft :=

l=1 [Fi,t−l,l

− Oit ]+

n

,

n = t for t < L; n = L for t ≥ L

• Base Forecast Inflation: The percent forecast inflation with respect to the
mean consumer demand (µD ).
Pn

base_inft :=

l=1

!

Fi,t−l,l
− µD /µD ,
n

n = t for t < L; n = L for t ≥ L

Given that forecasts in our framework refer to soft orders, the first three metrics
measure buyers’ forecast accuracy with respect to their firm orders. The base inflation
metric is used to investigate whether players would submit a forecast different than
µD = 200. If forecasts are higher than 200, it may indicate that buyers are inflating
their forecasts with respect to the consumer demand but not necessarily with respect
to the orders they are planning to place. Since buyers face inventory rationing, it
is possible to see forecast inflation with respect to both consumer demand and firm
orders, potentially at varying levels by allocation policy and communication, which
we discuss next.

2.3.2

Capacity Allocation

Capacity allocation decisions are important in any industry where a supplier needs
to make an allocation decision when the total demand from his buyers exceeds available inventory. Accordingly, developing effective allocation mechanisms has received
considerable attention in theoretical studies, primarily in one-supplier-two-buyer settings. There are four common allocation schemes: proportional, linear, lexicographic
and uniform (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999a,b). In “individually responsive” policies
such as proportional or linear allocation, a buyer can receive a larger allocation by
placing a larger order, which motivates the buyer to act strategically and inflate her
order. On the other hand, with uniform allocation or lexicographic allocation (which
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specifies a sequence in which retailer orders are to be satisfied irrespective of order
sizes), truth-telling behavior is shown to be a dominant NE and there is no order
inflation. Behavioral studies on capacity allocation focus on proportional allocation
mechanisms in one-shot games, and find that NE exaggerates buyers’ tendency to
strategically order more than they need. Chen et al. (2012) and Chen and Zhao
(2015) develop a behavioral model based on the quantal response equilibrium under deterministic and stochastic demand, respectively, while Cui and Zhang (2017)
propose a behavioral model based on cognitive hierarchy theory.
We contribute to this literature by investigating allocation policies in a multiperiod setting with inventory carryover. In theoretical studies, uniform allocation
has been shown to result in no order inflation unless there is demand competition for
the buyers (Liu, 2012; Cho and Tang, 2014). However, this has not been analyzed
for its effect on order forecast inflation. Thus, we use UNI as our control scenario to
investigate whether buyers would have any motivation to inflate their order forecasts
under this mechanism. We additionally design a new mechanism (FCT), where the
supplier “favors” the buyer with the better order forecast accuracy in determining
the allocation. Mallik and Harker (2004) and Karabuk and Wu (2005), who study
capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing, find that proportional allocation
can result in truthful forecast sharing with carefully designed bonus payment schemes
that reward forecast accuracy. Instead of a monetary incentive, our reward mechanism
is directly linked to the allocation policy. Using the lab as a test bed, we compare
FCT to UNI in its effectiveness in inducing truth-telling behavior, which leads to
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1. FCT reduces buyers’ order forecast inflation and improves order
forecast accuracy compared to UNI in a multi-period capacity allocation game.
For game theoretical analysis, it is typically assumed that buyers have perfect
knowledge of their supplier’s allocation policy, while in practice, the supplier may
24

not disclose his allocation policy to his buyers (Krishnan et al., 2007), and buyers
may make certain assumptions affecting their behavior. We investigate this in an
experimental framework, and expect both policies to perform better if the policy is
communicated to the buyers (Hypothesis 2(i)). Moreover, a rewarding mechanism can
be expected to be more effective in inducing truth-telling behavior if buyers are aware
of it. Thus, we expect FCT to more significantly improve order forecast accuracy
compared to UNI when it is implemented with communication (Hypothesis 2(ii)).
Hypothesis 2. (i) Communication of an allocation policy to the buyers reduces buyers’ order forecast inflation and improves order forecast accuracy for both UNI and
FCT in a multi-period capacity allocation game. (ii) FCT is more effective in improving buyers’ order forecast accuracy compared to UNI when it is implemented with
communication in a multi-period capacity allocation game.

2.3.3

Bullwhip Effect

The bullwhip effect refers to the amplification in order variability as one moves upstream in the supply chain from retail to the source of production. Lee et al. (1997b)
identify four sources of the bullwhip effect: demand signal processing, inventory rationing, order batching, and price variations. Theoretically, once these operational
causes are removed, the bullwhip effect should no longer be observed. However, using
the classical beer game, Croson and Donohue (2006) find evidence of the bullwhip
effect in lab experiments, even when the demand distribution is shared and all other
causes are removed. They attribute this phenomenon to “underweighting the supply
line,” reported also by Sterman (1989); Niranjan et al. (2011); Bloomfield and Kulp
(2013); Croson et al. (2014) and Narayanan and Moritz (2015), where players may not
account for the previous orders that have not yet been received from their supplier
(“on-order quantity” in this chapter) when placing orders in the next period.
In this study, our primary focus is on buyers’ order forecast accuracy, which is a
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function of the firm orders that they place with the supplier. One might expect that
order forecast accuracy may deteriorate if orders are highly variable, or conversely,
improving order forecast accuracy can also help with reducing the order variability
that the supplier observes. Thus, we investigate the potential bullwhip effect in
our setting, which is limited to that of a single echelon as in Bloomfield and Kulp
(2013), since the supplier is automated. Unlike previous studies, we consider one
of the operational causes of the bullwhip effect: inventory rationing. Even though
there is no transit lag (shipment lead-time is zero), a buyer cannot receive her order
immediately unless the supplier has enough inventory, which also depends on the
other buyer’s order quantity. Therefore, we expect the orders to be more variable
than demand. However, order variability may be reduced under FCT (compared
to UNI) as buyers may want to keep a more stable order pattern to improve their
order forecast accuracy. In particular, when the allocation policy is communicated,
the buyers’ uncertainty in the supplier’s actions would be reduced, and they would
need to rely less on “learning by doing”.
Hypothesis 3. The bullwhip effect is reduced under FCT compared to UNI when
it is implemented with communication in a multi-period capacity allocation game.

2.4

Experimental Design and Results

In this section, we discuss the experimental design to test our hypotheses, and present
our results.

2.4.1

Experimental Design

Our research focus is on the effect of the implementation and communication of FCT
in improving buyers’ forecast accuracy. Thus, we use a 2x2 between-subjects design
for our experiments (Table 2.4). The first factor represents the implementation of the
allocation policy: UNI vs. FCT. The second factor represents the communication of
26

an allocation policy: no information (NI) vs. information (I). In the NI treatments,
we do not disclose any information about how the supplier allocates inventory to his
buyers, while in the I treatments, we provide the following information to the subjects:
Under UNI, “When total order exceeds inventory, supplier will make an equal amount
of inventory “available” to each buyer. Each buyer can then receive up to their order
amount from the inventory made available to them, and the remaining portion of the
inventory will be made available, again equally, to the remaining buyers who still have
excess demand, etc. until all the inventory is allocated.”, and under FCT, “When
the supplier has tight capacity, he may favor the buyer with higher forecast accuracy
in allocating inventory.” Note that to make the experiments realistic, we provide
relatively discreet information about the allocation mechanism, particularly for FCT.
Thus, the information presented to the subjects is only expected to make them aware
of the rewarding mechanism in FCT, which may motivate them to improve their
forecast accuracy.
The design matrix is given in Table 2.4. Each cell includes the treatment number,
and the number of subjects who participated in the treatment (in parentheses, excluding outliers). Our base treatment is 1 while our main treatment of interest is 4.
The comparisons between treatments 1 vs. 2 and 3 vs. 4 help us see the effectiveness
of FCT relative to UNI (Hypothesis 1), while 1 vs. 3 and 2 vs. 4 help us see
the impact of communication on the effectiveness of an allocation policy (Hypothesis
2(i)). We also provide cross comparisons of 1 vs. 4 and 2 vs. 3 to further investigate
the effectiveness of FCT over UNI with communication for either policy (Hypothesis
2(ii)).
We recruited student subjects from two major universities in the southeastern
U.S.: industrial engineering majors and business students majoring in supply chain
management, at undergraduate and graduate levels. A subject was allowed to participate in only one experiment session, and was required to have taken a supply chain
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Table 2.4: Experimental Design
Implementation
Information
NI
I

UNI
1 (36)
3 (40)

FCT
2 (40)
4 (40)

related course prior to the session to qualify. In each session, subjects were randomly
assigned to a treatment, and those who were assigned to I treatments were provided
the information text on a separate piece of paper. Each subject was matched with
another randomly selected subject to be sourced from the same supplier and had to
play with the same “partner” throughout the game session. The subjects did not
know the identity of their partners. We refer to the two subjects that were assigned
to the same supplier as a “buyer pair.” Accordingly, the number of pairs analyzed
in each treatment corresponds to half of the number of subjects given in Table 2.4.
While more subjects participated in the game sessions, we removed some of them
from the analysis (singles and outliers; see Appendix A.1 for details).
All subjects played the game for 50 periods (T = 50) but were not told upfront
about the duration of the game so as to avoid end-of-game effects. As the supplier
was automated, the game advanced to the next period once both subjects in a buyer
pair submitted their orders. Each session lasted about 75-90 minutes. At the beginning of a session, we explained the game context and dynamics to the subjects, as
described in Section 2.2, and walked them through the game screens. The buyer’s
revenue/cost parameters were presented to all subjects; however, supplier parameters
were kept private (except for the supplier’s selling price, which is the procurement
cost for the buyers). We also did not give any specific information about the supplier’s production and allocation policies, except for the information described above
for the I treatments. To ensure that the subjects understood the basics, decision
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tasks, and metrics displayed on the game screens, we gave a verbal quiz.3 Only after
we received the correct answers and clarified the subjects’ questions, we started the
session.
To encourage participation and motivate the subjects to play the game with best
effort, we offered monetary incentives: a fixed fee of $20 for participation, and an
additional reward of up to $10 based on their performance. We calculated this additional reward in proportion to each player’s profit such that the player with the
lowest profit during the game session received $0, while the player with the highest
profit received $10. The payoffs for the remaining players were distributed on this
scale in proportion to their profit.

2.4.2

Experimental Results

Our dataset consists of 7800 observations from 156 subjects over 50 periods (see Table
2.4). All statistical analysis is conducted in Stata 14.2. We use the nonparametric
Mann-Whitney (MW) test for all statistical comparisons unless otherwise stated.4
We first compare the first half of the game (the first 25 periods) with the second
half of the game (the last 25 periods) using the descriptive statistics given in Table
2.5. We observe a clear learning effect with higher profits per period, lower backlogs,
higher service levels for the buyers and the supplier (supplier’s average fill rate gets
closer to the target level of 85%), and more stable inventory positions (lower standard deviation) in the second half of the game. As these differences are statistically
significant (MW test, p < 0.001), we only report the analysis results from the second
half of the game, with more stable decisions in a relatively “steady-state” system.5
3

The game screens and the verbal quiz are provided in Appendices A.5 and A.6.

4

We identified periods with very high/low orders that could bias forecast accuracy metrics. This
outlier detection process removed 95 (226) observations from the second (first) half (referred to as
“order outliers”). Our robustness checks confirm that including these outliers does not generally
change our main results. See Appendix A.1 for details.
5

See Appendix A.3 for the analysis of the first half of the game.
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Table 2.5: Learning Effect over Time
1st Half
M ean S.D. M edian
Profit (π)
On-hand inventory (I)
Backlog (B)
Inventory position (IP b )
Order quantity (O)
Service level (SL)
Supplier’s fill rate (F L)

175.0
40.8
38.8
276.6
210.2
83%
71%

81.2
95.4
56.6
143.0
48.2
24%
31%

182.3
0
13
249
210
94%
79%

2nd Half
M ean S.D. M edian
185.7
45.7
14.8
266.3
199.3
93%
84%

68.8
59.9
28.1
68.5
41.6
13%
21%

190.1
21
0
251
200
100%
96%

Note. N = 3674 observations in the first half and N = 3805 in the second half.
S.D.: Standard Deviation

We next compare treatments to understand the effect of the implementation and
communication of a capacity allocation policy on order forecast accuracy. We calculate the average order forecast submitted for each period t as F¯it =

Pn
l=1

Fi,t−l,l
n

(for

n = t for t < 4; n = 4 for t ≥ 4). Descriptive statistics on the order quantity, forecast, and forecast accuracy metrics by treatment are given in Table 2.6. All analysis
is conducted at the subject level using the MW test unless otherwise stated.6 We
present the box plots of all forecast accuracy metrics at the subject and pair levels in
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, and by treatment over time in Figure 2.5.
We first observe in Table 2.6 that while order quantities are very similar across
treatments and there is no evidence of order inflation, there is significant variation
in the submitted order forecasts across subjects within a treatment as well as across
treatments. Namely, the mean and median order forecast are highest under treatment
1 and lowest under 4.7 In all treatments, we observe that order forecasts are higher
than the mean of the consumer demand distribution, 200. In other words, there is
significant base forecast inflation (base_inf ), particularly under treatment 1. We also
6

The MW test results for all forecast accuracy metrics can be found in detail in Appendix A.2.

7

The differences between 1 vs. 2 (p < 0.1) and 1 vs. 4 (p < 0.01), and 4 vs. 3 (p < 0.05) are
statistically significant.
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observe that order forecasts are generally higher than the order quantities.8 Using
the pooled dataset across all treatments, we confirm that forecasts (soft orders) are
not accurate with respect to the firm orders that are placed. Analyzing the average
order forecast error by subject closely, we observe over-reporting behavior (forecast
inflation) in 83% of the subjects (m_f e > 0, M ean = 16.7, S.D. = 20.9), and underreporting behavior in 17% of the subjects (m_f e < 0, M ean = −8.0, S.D. = 10.9).
Thus, the inflation behavior is more persistent with a larger magnitude and higher
variability compared to under-reporting.
We next observe that 1 has the highest base and mean forecast inflation among
all treatments. Given that the mean order quantity under 1 is 200.9, this observation
provides significant evidence that human subjects choose to inflate order forecasts
even when there is no clear reason for them to do so. Recall that the supplier follows
a base-stock production policy and uniform allocation policy under this treatment.
Thus, the submitted forecasts do not have any impact on the supplier’s production or
allocation policy under treatments 1 and 3. However, since the subjects do not have
this information under 1, they seem to think that inflating forecasts will be beneficial.
To test Hypothesis 1, we compare 1 vs. 2, and find that simply changing the
capacity allocation policy from uniform allocation (UNI) to one that rewards accurate forecasts (FCT) reduces order forecast inflation and error significantly.9 That
is, order forecast inflation and bias are reduced even when FCT is implemented without communication. Hence, under 2, despite having the same level of information as
under 1, buyers seem to learn based on their observations/experience over time that
more accurate forecasts lead to better service.10 When the capacity allocation policy
8

Order forecasts are higher than both 200 and order quantities at p < 0.001 using the Wilxocon
signed rank test.
9

base_inf : p = 0.094; m_inf : p = 0.026; m_f e : p = 0.086.

10

One subject who played treatment 2 wrote the following feedback to us after the experiment
session: “... the worse my forecast was, the less the supplier seemed willing to fulfill my orders
immediately. Once I realized this, I eventually got back to normal by ordering within a range of
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Allocation Policy on Buyers’ Order Forecast Accuracy
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NI/UNI

NI/FCT

I/UNI

I/FCT

1

2

3

4

N

36

40

40

40

Ō

200.9 (13.4) [198.1]

199.7 (6.7) [199.2]

198.6 (4.8) [199.6]

198.9 (6.6) [199.8]

F̄

220.9 (27.2) [211.8]

214.3 (31.2) [204.0]

210.8 (15.2) [207.0]

204.2 (10.0) [202.3]

base_inf

10% (14%) [6%]

7% (16%) [2%]

5% (8%)

m_f e

20.0 (23.6) [14.5]

14.6 (28.7) [7.3]

12.2 (15.6) [9.7]

5.3 (11.1) [3.2]

ma_f e

45.1 (19.9) [41.8]

40.2 (27.5) [32.3]

34.9 (14.7) [33.6]

30.9 (17.1) [29.0]

m_inf

32.6 (19.7) [25.2]

27.4 (26.1) [21.7]

23.5 (11.5) [20.7]

18.1 (11.2) [18.9]

[4%]

2% (5%)

[1%]

Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Median values are given in brackets. Ō is the average
order quantity and F̄ is the average order forecast across subjects.
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Figure 2.3: Order Forecast Accuracy Metrics by Subject - Treatment
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Figure 2.4: Order Forecast Accuracy Metrics by Pair - Treatment
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Figure 2.5: Order Forecast Accuracy Metrics over Time by Treatment
is communicated to the buyers, comparing 3 vs. 4, we find that FCT again reduces
the order forecast inflation and error compared to UNI.11 While the difference in
ma_f e is not statistically significant for either 1 vs. 2 or 3 vs. 4, Hypothesis 1
is supported in three out of four metrics: FCT improves order forecast accuracy by
reducing buyers’ order forecast inflation and bias compared to UNI.
To test Hypothesis 2, we first compare 1 vs. 3, and find that communication of the
allocation policy significantly improves order forecast accuracy for UNI in two out of
four metrics: reducing the mean order forecast inflation and absolute forecast error
(p < 0.05). This finding supports our previous interpretation of the behavior under
1 that subjects seem to assume that inflating forecasts will be beneficial when they
do not have information about what policy the supplier uses. Once they know that
160-240 each period. This gave me a lot of insight about how I and (probably) others tend to act in
situations where variability is involved.”
11

base_inf : p = 0.019; m_inf : p = 0.059; m_f e : p = 0.005.
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the supplier’s allocation is uniform, they no longer seem to find a reason to inflate
their forecasts as much. We next compare 2 vs. 4, and find a similar result (despite
a weaker support, p < 0.1): communication of the allocation policy improves order
forecast accuracy for FCT by reducing the mean order forecast inflation and absolute forecast error. Thus, Hypothesis 2(i) is supported in two out of four metrics:12
Communication improves order forecast accuracy by reducing buyers’ order forecast
inflation and absolute forecast error for both allocation policies; however, its effect is
more significant for UNI than FCT. Communication also does not seem to have a
significant effect on the forecast bias (m_f e) for either policy.
Finally, using cross-comparisons, we find that 4 significantly improves order forecast accuracy compared to 1 on all four metrics (p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 2(ii) is
supported: When FCT is implemented with communication, it effectively improves
order forecast accuracy over UNI with or without communication by reducing order
forecast inflation and bias. Interestingly, a similar cross-effect does not apply for
UNI: the difference for 3 vs. 2 is not significant at the subject or pair level for
any of the four metrics. Thus, UNI with communication seems to have a similar
performance in order forecast accuracy as FCT without communication.
In summary, we find that:
• Rewarding forecast accuracy in a proportional allocation policy (FCT) can
reduce order forecast inflation and bias, compared to a uniform allocation policy
(UNI), even when the supplier does not communicate his policy to the buyers.
• UNI with communication can still not provide lower order forecast inflation
and bias than FCT, even without communication. However, communication
12

For 2 vs. 4, m_inf : p = 0.096 at the subject and p = 0.07 at the pair level, while ma_f e is
only significant at the pair level, p = 0.037. Although the MW test does not find the base_inf and
m_f e differences significant at the subject or pair level, the unpaired t-test with unequal variances
find both differences significant: For 2 vs. 4, base_inf : p = 0.046 and m_f e : p = 0.065, and for
1 vs. 3, base_inf : p = 0.028 and m_f e : p = 0.05.
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can help reduce order forecast inflation and improve order forecast accuracy
under both policies (more significantly for UNI).
• FCT is most effective in reducing buyers’ order forecast inflation and improving
order forecast accuracy when it is implemented with communication, providing
the most stable (lowest standard deviation) and accurate forecasts.
We next test Hypothesis 3, i.e., the significance of the bullwhip effect, comparing
2
2
.
, to the variability in the consumer demand, σD
the variability in buyer orders, σO

We utilize the nonparametric sign test used in previous studies (Seigel, 1965, p. 68).
For each player, we code an increase in the variance of orders placed as a success and
a decrease as a failure. If there are no order variance amplifications, we should have
2
2
at the chance rate of 50%. As seen in Table 2.6, there are no significant
> σD
σO

differences between the average order quantities across treatments. In Table 2.7, we
provide descriptive statistics on the standard deviation of orders and the variance
amplification of orders at the subject level. We observe that the mean and median
of the standard deviation of orders and the amplification factor for both policies are
relatively lower with vs. without communication (3 and 4 vs. 1 and 2). Moreover, the
sign test shows that the bullwhip effect is statistically significant in all treatments
except 4.13 In other words, when FCT is implemented with communication, the
bullwhip effect is no longer statistically significant. Thus, we find significant support
for Hypothesis 3 as an added benefit of the FCT policy, which complements the
empirical findings of Chen and Lee (2009)—sharing “truthful” order forecasts with
the supplier can also help with reducing the order variability and the bullwhip effect.
To investigate whether subjects underweight the supply line in our setting contributing to the bullwhip effect, we use an approach similar to Croson and Donohue
13

1: p = 0.002 with 75% success rate, 2 and 3: p = 0.077 with 63% success rate, 4: p = 0.4373
2
2
with 53% success rate. The Wilcoxon signed rank test also fails to reject the null hypothesis σO
= σD
for 4 (p > 0.1).
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(2006) and Niranjan et al. (2011). We run a fixed effects regression model for each
treatment, and estimate the subjects’ base stock level as a function of previous period’s demand, on-hand inventory, backlog, received shipment and on-order quantity
(we provide a more detailed analysis on this in Chapter 4). Our results are consistent
with the literature: subjects underweight the supply line regardless of the allocation
policy (the coefficient for on-order quantity is closer to 0 than -1 in all treatments).
However, when we incorporate the average order forecast into the estimation, we find
that it has a statistically significant effect (0.321, p < 0.01) for treatment 4, which
suggests that subjects take the submitted forecasts into account when placing their
orders. This further supports our expectations that when FCT is implemented with
communication, buyers are motivated to share truthful order forecasts, or equivalently, submit orders in line with their forecasts.
Table 2.7: The Effect of Allocation Policy on Buyers’ Order Variability
2
2
/σD
σO
σO
T reatment N M ean[M edian] M in M ax M ean[M edian] M ax 90th perc.

NI/UNI
NI/FCT
I/UNI
I/FCT

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

36
40
40
40

44.3
39.6
37.5
37.4

[44.9]
[40.1]
[36.6]
[36.0]

12.56 80.88
11.7 68.2
10.4 78.2
9.6
64.4

1.92
1.57
1.37
1.48

[1.46]
[1.37]
[1.14]
[1.18]

6.73
5.50
3.94
5.05

3.90
3.09
2.75
3.59

Note. σO columns give the mean [median], min and max of the standard deviation
of orders at the subject level. The last three columns give the mean [median],
max and 90th percentile of the variance amplification factor at the subject level.

2.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed the effect of a supplier’s capacity allocation policy on
the buyers’ order forecast accuracy, defined as the difference between the planned
(soft) orders and the placed (firm) order, in a multi-period setting with inventory
carryover. We proposed a new allocation policy (FCT), which allocates limited supply proportionate to the orders but favors the buyer with the better order forecast
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accuracy. Using the lab environment as a test bed, we compared FCT to the uniform
allocation policy (UNI). We found that under FCT, buyers’ order forecast accuracy
is significantly improved compared to when the supplier uses UNI. Thus, our results
show that the proportional allocation policy, which is known to motivate order inflating behavior, can be modified to reward order forecast accuracy to dampen order
inflation, and consistently reduce order forecast inflation, even when the supplier does
not communicate this policy to the buyers.
We also found that communication has a critical role in the effectiveness of an
allocation policy. UNI, which has been suggested in analytical studies as a truthinducing mechanism for orders, resulted in the highest order forecast inflation when
the supplier did not disclose any information about his policy to the buyers. Under
lack of information, buyers seemed to assume that inflating order forecasts could be
beneficial in securing supply. Once UNI was implemented with communication, there
was a significant reduction in the order forecast inflation. FCT was also found to
be more effective when it was implemented with communication to the buyers. This
has an important practical implication as suppliers may not disclose their allocation
policies to their customers in real-life (Krishnan et al., 2007). Our results suggest
that if the supplier wants truthful order forecasts from his buyers, then he should
openly communicate the allocation policy to the buyers, similar to the connection
between trust and trustworthiness analyzed in Özer et al. (2011). However, we also
find that FCT improves order forecast accuracy compared to UNI even without
communication.
Note that since the supplier employs a base-stock production policy in this study,
the estimated benefit of FCT is conservative. Since the supplier’s overall service level
to the buyers does not change (significantly) with improved order forecast accuracy,
we find that the difference in buyers’ average profits across the treatments is not
statistically significant. Moreover, buyers’ service level to the consumers under 4
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(median = 95.6%) is almost identical to that under 3 (median = 95.3%), which
are both statistically significantly higher (p < 0.05) than that under 2 (median =
92.8%). The service level under 1 (median = 94.0%) is not found to be statistically
different than other treatments (p > 0.1). We expect that the comparison of profits
and service levels between the two allocation policies would lead to additional insights
if the supplier’s production policy were also a function of the buyers’ order forecast
accuracy. When that is the case, a buyer may see a tangible improvement in her
supplier’s service level when she improves her own order forecast accuracy regardless
of how the other buyers are forecasting. This may change the order forecasting
behavior of the buyers yet again, which is an interesting direction for future research.
With our proposed allocation policy, we show that forecast accuracy can improve
even though there are no advance order commitments. This is important in practical
settings, such as semiconductor manufacturing, where the forecasts usually represent
soft orders without any contractual obligations. Future research could investigate the
effect of an order flexibility contract, where the buyers need to commit to a certain
percentage of their orders in advance of the firm order date. Such a commitment
may motivate the buyers to share truthful forecasts. To the best of our knowledge,
this type of contract, also known as the quantity flexibility contract, has not been yet
studied through behavioral experiments.
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Chapter 3
Characterizing Buyers’ Optimal Ordering
Decisions in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
3.1

Introduction and Literature Review

In this chapter, we characterize a buyer’s ordering decisions in a two-stage supply
chain, considering a similar framework as in Chapter 2, using analytical and numerical
simulation approaches. We first start with a single buyer-single supplier setting. We
assume that there are linear ordering, inventory holding, and backordering costs,
but no fixed ordering or setup costs. The buyer in our supply chain uses a base
stock policy. Therefore, in each period, she chooses an order quantity to raise her
inventory position to her target base stock level. She orders from a single supplier,
who also uses a base stock inventory policy, and chooses a production quantity in
each period to raise his inventory position to his target base stock level. Consumer
demand at the buyer (lowest echelon) is stochastic, independent across periods and
stationary. Unmet demand is backlogged at each stage (i.e., there is no lost sales).
Since the expected demand per period is constant without any lost sales, the goal
of maximizing her total profit is identical to the goal of minimizing her total costs.
There is a constant production lead time at the supplier side, while the delivery
lead time from the supplier to the buyer and from the buyer to the end-customer is
short relative to the production lead time, thus assumed to be zero. We also analyze
two additional two-echelon supply chain settings, where (1) a single supplier serves a
single buyer that serves two independent markets; and (2) a single supplier serves two
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independent buyers (i.e., each buyer serves an independent market). Mathematically,
the first one can be considered as a centralized two buyers case, while the latter as a
decentralized two buyers case.
There is a rich literature that studies multi-echelon inventory policies since the
seminal work of Clark and Scarf (1960). Note that our literature review focuses on
multi-echelon inventory systems, where each echelon is allowed to keep inventory,
and excludes studies involving a depot-warehouse system, where each depot is not
allowed to hold inventory. In typical settings, inventory is managed using either
echelon inventory or local inventory. A firm’s local inventory position refers to its
on-hand inventory plus in-transit and on-order inventory minus backorders, while its
echelon inventory position is its local inventory position plus the inventory position
of all downstream stages (in the direction of consumer demand). The system optimal
solution that minimizes the total average cost per period in such a setting is shown
to be an echelon base stock policy (Clark and Scarf, 1960; Federgruen and Zipkin,
1984; Chen and Zheng, 1994). Using a finite horizon model, Clark and Scarf (1960)
show that if the upper stream has infinite capacity, the problem can be decomposed
into separate single-location problems for each echelon. Thus, the optimal ordering
policy can be characterized based purely on echelon inventories. Federgruen and
Zipkin (1984) extend their model to infinite horizon under both discounted and average cost criteria, and propose an improved method for optimal policy computations.
Chen and Zheng (1994) identify lower bounds on the minimum cost of serial, assembly and one-warehouse-multi-retailer systems by using a cost allocation scheme, and
present simpler proofs on the optimality of the policies from the literature. These uncapacitated models are further extended with the inclusion of a production capacity
constraint, which may preclude restoring inventories to their base-stock levels in a single period, for a single-stage system in Federgruen and Zipkin (1986a,b), a two-stage
system in Parker and Kapuscinski (2004), and a multi-stage system in Glasserman
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and Tayur (1995). The optimality of a modified base-stock policy under a capacity
constraint is shown for the average-cost criterion with discrete demand (Federgruen
and Zipkin, 1986a) and the discounted-cost criterion with continuous demand (Federgruen and Zipkin, 1986b), when there is no fixed cost of ordering/setup. While
Speck and van der Wal (1991) demonstrate many cases that the modified base-stock
policy is not necessarily the optimal policy for periodic review, Parker and Kapuscinski (2004) show that a modified echelon base-stock policy is indeed optimal in a
two-stage system, when the downstream capacity is smaller than the upstream capacity. Parker and Kapuscinski (2004) also show that the optimality holds for both
stationary and nonstationary stochastic demand cases. Glasserman and Tayur (1995)
use a simulation approach to compute derivative estimates for base stock levels in a
capacitated multi-echelon system, and show the effectiveness of these estimates in
identifying optimal base-stock levels for complex realistic systems. Shang and Song
(2003) propose a simple heuristic that reduces a complex N -stage supply chain optimization problem into 2N simple newsvendor-type single-stage cost functions, which
provide both an upper bound and a lower bound for the echelon cost functions.
While these papers assume centralized policies to optimize total supply chain performance, some studies also consider decentralized decision making, where each stage
independently chooses its base stock policy to minimize its own cost (Lee and Whang,
1999; Chen, 1999; Cachon and Zipkin, 1999; Porteus, 2000; JemaÏ and Karaesmen,
2007). Cachon and Zipkin (1999) study both echelon inventory and local inventory
tracking regimes and compare the equilibrium between the two regimes. In many
decentralized supply chain settings, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, but the Nash
equilibrium decisions often deviate from the system optimal decisions (Cachon and
Zipkin, 1999). Thus, to align the incentives of the supply chain partners, many studies
propose coordination schemes, which are designed in a way that the system optimum
can be reached when each firm chooses a policy that minimizes its own cost function.
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Examples of such coordination schemes include contracts (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999;
Lee and Whang, 1999; Cachon, 2003; JemaÏ and Karaesmen, 2007; Sieke et al., 2012)
that allocate costs/benefits to the firms; incentive-compatible measurement schemes
such as one based on accounting inventory levels (Chen, 1999)1 ; and responsibility
tokens which reimburse the unsatisfied order within the same period (Porteus, 2000)2 .
The common contract types include linear transfer payment contracts (Cachon and
Zipkin, 1999; JemaÏ and Karaesmen, 2007), nonlinear transfer payment contracts
(Lee and Whang, 1999), and service level contracts (Sieke et al., 2012). Interested
readers are referred to Cachon (2003), which provides an overview of the supply chain
contracts literature. Our work focuses on the optimal decisions of buyers in a decentralized setting, to particularly understand the behavioral aspects of decision making,
and thus we do not propose any coordination schemes.
In setting base stock levels for the buyers and supplier, we use fill rate as a service
level metric, which is defined as the fraction of demand/order immediately satisfied
from on-hand inventory. The fill rate calculation for periodic review systems is more
difficult to characterize and calculate than continuous review systems (Zipkin, 2000).
By definition, the fill rate should be computed as the expectation of the ratio of the
fulfilled demand in a replenishment cycle to the total demand in a replenishment
cycle (Guijarro et al., 2012; Babiloni et al., 2012). However, traditionally the fill rate
is computed (approximated) using the ratio of the expected units short per replenishment cycle to the expected total demand per replenishment cycle (Hadley and Whitin,
1963; Johnson et al., 1995; de Kok, 2002). In order for the traditional approach to
be accurate, certain conditions, such as (1) infinite horizon and (2) sufficiently large
replenishment order to meet existing backorders, should hold (Chen et al., 2003). The
calculation of the expected units short per cycle has been addressed with different
1

An echelon’s accounting inventory level is obtained by an echelon’s on-hand inventory minus
backorders from the downstream echelon assuming unlimited upstream capacity.
2

Therefore, every order can be fully served with either actual products or responsibility tokens.
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approaches in the literature. Hadley and Whitin (1963) compute it as the difference
between the expected total backlog during the replenishment cycle and lead time
minus the expected backlog during the lead time, while Johnson et al. (1995) show
that this result may result in inaccurate computations especially when the demand
variability is high or when the replenishment order is not sufficient to fulfill existing
backorders within one period, and propose an alternative fill rate expression. There
is a recent stream of papers that focus on exact fill rate computations (Sobel, 2004;
Zhang and Zhang, 2007; Teunter, 2009; Silver and Bischak, 2011; Babiloni et al.,
2012; Guijarro et al., 2012) in single-stage and/or multi-stage serial supply chain systems. Luo et al. (2014) compare the performance of nine different fill rate expressions
through numerical simulations, and show that when the coefficient of variation (CV )
is low (CV < 0.9), all expressions provide accurate fill rate. Accordingly, since we
use a low CV in our behavioral experiments (CV = 0.2), we use the traditional fill
rate computation in setting our base stock levels.
In addition to the research on fill rate computations, there are also studies on the
optimal inventory policies under fill rate constraints in single-stage and multi-stage
serial supply chain systems (Boyaci and Gallego, 2001; Axsäter, 2003; Shang and
Song, 2006; Sieke et al., 2012). Boyaci and Gallego (2001) investigate the optimal
periodic-review echelon base-stock policy, which minimizes average inventory costs
of the entire serial production/distribution systems subject to fill-rate constraints at
the system level. Thus, their focus is on “how to stock and where to stock under
fill-rate type constraints” (Boyaci and Gallego, 2001). In a continuous review serial
production/distribution system, Axsäter (2003) show that a multi-stage echelon stock
(R, nQ) policy3 that minimizes holding and backorder costs is optimal. Since exactly
meeting the desired fill rate with a pure base-stock policy may be impossible under
3

Since the model in Axsäter (2003) utilizes a continuous review system, R represents the reorder
point, and Q represents the batch size.
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discrete demand in practice, applying a combination of multiple base-stock policies,
which could achieve the desired fill rate on the average, would be desirable (Boyaci
et al., 2003), and as well be optimal (Axsäter, 2003). Shang and Song (2006) provide
a closed-form approximation for the optimal base-stock policies in serial supply chain
systems. These studies generally concentrate on the system optimal decisions of the
supplier that should minimize the inventory holding costs while satisfying the fill
rate constraints to the external buyer(s), while our focus is on the optimal ordering
decisions of the buyer(s) under less-than-100% target fill rate of the supplier.
Our goal in this chapter is to characterize the buyer’s optimal base-stock policy
and the associated ordering decisions under a target fill rate from their supplier using
an analytical approach for the one-buyer case, which we validate through numerical
simulations for both uniformly and normally distributed consumer demand. We then
utilize a numerical simulation approach for the two-buyer case, where the supplier
allocates inventory equally between the two buyers if the orders exceed available
inventory. We use these results in the next chapter to compare against the empirical
observations from the lab experiments.

3.2

Analysis of the One-Buyer Case

We derive an optimal inventory policy for a buyer in a two-echelon supply chain, where
a single supplier sells a product to a single buyer. The buyer (she) receives the product
from the supplier, and sells it to the consumers. The consumer demand is independent
and identically distributed across periods, and follows a known stationary distribution
with a mean of µD and a standard deviation of σD . We denote the cumulative
distribution function of demand with F (x) (increasing and differentiable) and the
probability density function with f (x). Both inventory and backlog units are carried
over to the next period. If the supplier does not have enough inventory to fulfill
the buyer’s order, he backlogs the unsatisfied order and fulfills it in future periods.
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The backlogged orders are referred to as the “on-order” quantity. Similarly, if the
consumer demand exceeds buyer’s available inventory, the buyer backlogs the demand
and fulfills it in future periods. We assume that backlogs are always satisfied first in
a given period (i.e., before the demand/orders of the current period). This approach
ensures that the buyer/supplier does not build up backorders.
Both the supplier and the buyer utilize a (local) base-stock policy. Consistent with
Chapter 2, we use fill rate as the supplier’s service level metric, which denotes the
fraction of order/demand satisfied from on-hand inventory. We use a target service
level of β for the supplier’s base stock level. We first present a single-buyer base-stock
inventory model with a supplier that provides 100% fill rate (β = 1.0) in Section 3.2.1
and less than 100% fill rate (β < 1.0) in Section 3.2.2.
We provide the key notation used in this chapter in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Key Notation
Notation
SB
p
c
h
b
β
Dt
Ot
Rt
Nt
ILt :
IPt :
It :
Bt :
πt

Definition
Buyer’s base-stock level
Unit revenue (selling price)
Unit procurement cost
Unit inventory holding cost
Unit backlogging cost
Supplier’s target fill-rate to the buyer (0 < β ≤ 1)
Consumer demand realized by the buyer in period t
Order quantity placed by the buyer at the beginning of period t
Received shipment by the buyer at the beginning of period t
On-order quantity the supplier owes the buyer at the end of period t
Inventory level of the buyer at the beginning of period t
Inventory position of the buyer before placing an order in period t
On-hand inventory of buyer i at the end of period t
Backlog of buyer i at the end of period t
Buyer’s profit for period t
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3.2.1

A One-Buyer Base Stock Inventory Model under 100% Fill-Rate

In this section, we present a single-buyer base-stock inventory model under fully
reliable supply (i.e., 100% fill-rate), where the supplier always maintains enough
inventory to immediately fulfill the buyer’s order from stock.
After the buyer brings her inventory position to her target base stock level, SB ,
in period 1, the expected per-period profit over an infinite horizon is calculated as:
E [π (SB )] = (p − c) µD
−h

Z SB
0

(SB − x) f (x)dx − b

Z ∞
SB

(x − SB )f (x)dx

(3.1)

First order conditions of the buyer’s expected per-period profit gives:
∂E [π (SB )]
= b − (h + b) F (SB ) = 0
∂SB
⇒

SB∗

= F

−1

b
h+b

!

(3.2)

Second order conditions confirm that the per-period profit function is concave,
and thus SB∗ is a global optimal:
∂ 2 E [π (SB )]
= − (h + b) f (SB ) < 0
∂ 2 SB

(3.3)

Thus, over an infinite horizon, the optimal base stock level for a buyer, who is
served by a fully reliable supplier, is SB∗ = F −1
3.2.2



b
h+b



, as shown in the literature.

A One-Buyer Base Stock Inventory Model under less-than-100%
Fill-Rate

In this section, we present a single-buyer base-stock inventory model under less than
100% reliable supply, where the supplier also uses a base stock policy with a target
fill rate of β < 1.0.
After placing an order equal to the base stock level (SB ) in period 1, the buyer
would order enough to raise her inventory position (IPt ) back to the target base stock
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level in period t, where the inventory position at the beginning of period t right before
placing an order is given by:
IPt = ILt−1 + Rt−1 + Nt−1 − Dt−1

for i = 1, 2; t = 2, ..., T

(3.4)

and ILt = It−1 − Bt−1 denotes buyer’s inventory level at the beginning of period t.
Thus, the order size would be given by the demand of the previous period (Dt−1 )
under a fully reliable supplier. However, since the supplier may not be able to send
the order size in full immediately, the buyer’s available-to-serve inventory in each
period is given by ILt + Rt or SB − Nt .
Following Cachon (2003) and Sieke et al. (2012), let Ss be the supplier’s base stock
level, Ds > 0 the demand realized during the supplier’s lead-time of Ls , and Fs (δ)
(increasing and differentiable) and fs (δ) be the cumulative distribution and density
functions of that demand, respectively. Note that as in the previous chapter, we
assume that the supplier replenishes according to consumer demand. We also define
Ir (SB ) =

Z SB
0

(SB − x) f (x)dx,

Br (SB ) =

Z ∞
SB

(x − SB )f (x)dx

(3.5)

We now derive the buyer’s expected per period cost over an infinite horizon as:
E [π (SB , Ss )] = (p − c) µD


Z ∞



S
Z s∞

−h Fs (Ss )Ir (SB ) −
−b Fs (Ss )Br (SB ) −

Ss

Ir (SB + Ss − δ)fs (δ)dδ



Br (SB + Ss − δ)fs (δ)dδ



(3.6)

Thus, if the supplier can raise the buyer’s inventory level to SB , the buyer’s profit
function reduces to the fully reliable supplier case, which happens with probability
Fs (Ss ). Otherwise, the retailer’s available inventory level equals SB + Ss − x (or
SB − Nt ).
As it has been shown in Cachon (2003), the optimal base stock level for the buyer
will be greater than that for the fully reliable supplier case, i.e., SB∗ > SB0 where
F (SB0 ) =
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b
h+b

similar to the 100% fill rate case.
While numerical solution of Equation (3.6) is possible, we demonstrate through
simulation that a reasonable approximation for a common demand distribution such
as uniform is as follows:
F (SB∗ − E[N ]) =

b
h+b

(3.7)

where E[N ] = (1 − β)µD . Thus, as the buyer’s expected order quantity over the long
term equals the expected consumer demand (based on an infinite horizon setting with
full back-ordering of unmet orders/demand), the supplier would be able to fulfill β of
the order immediately, and the expected on-order quantity would be (1 − β)µD given
that he maintains a target service level (fill rate) of β. Thus, the buyer’s target base
stock level would be increased by the expected on-order quantity.
We next validate this practical result through numerical simulation.

3.2.3

Numerical Simulation Analysis

In this section, we validate our base-stock inventory model derivations through numerical simulation. For this validation, we compare the heuristic base stock level we
calculated from the analytical model with the optimal value obtained from numerical
simulation. We use the same parameters for the buyer as in Chapter 2: unit selling
price of p = $2, unit procurement cost of c = $1, unit inventory-holding cost of
h = $0.15, and unit backlogging cost of b = $0.45.
We use two different scenarios: In the first scenario, the buyer sells a single
product to consumers in a single market, where consumer demand in each period
is independent and follows a uniform distribution (Scenario 1a) or a normal distribution (Scenario 1b). To provide comparable results with our behavioral study in
Chapter 2, we use a uniform distribution (∼ U [131, 269]) and a normal distribution
2
(∼ N (µD , σD
); µD = 200, σD = 40) that have the same mean and standard deviation

(µD = 200, σD = 40).
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In the second scenario, we extend the simulation to a case where the buyer serves
two independent markets, and the demand for each market is independent and identically distributed. Consistent with the first scenario, we use uniformly distributed
demand (Scenario 2a) as well as normally distributed demand (Scenario 2b). For
Scenario 2a, it is well known that the sum of independent and identical uniform
distributions follows an Irwin-Hall distribution (also known as “Uniform Sum Distribution”). As its special case, when a buyer serves two markets with independent and
identical uniform demand U (u1 , u2 ), the pooled demand follows a symmetric triangular distribution with lower limit 2u1 , upper limit 2u2 , and mode u1 + u2 , and its
cumulative density function is given by:

F (x) =






0








(x−2u1 )2


2

x < 2u1
2u1 ≤ x ≤ u1 + u2

2(u2 −u1 )



(2u2 −x)2


1 − 2(u −u )2

2
1







1

u1 + u2 ≤ x ≤ 2u2
x > 2u2

Next, we look into the supplier side. The supplier uses a base-stock policy, and
consistent with Chapter 2, has a 4-period lead time (Ls = 4). Since the supplier
replenishes according to consumer demand, which follows an independent and identical uniform distribution, the demand during the supplier’s lead time also follows an
Irwin-Hall distribution. For each buyer scenario, we use four target fill rates from
the supplier to the buyer: 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100%. While we allow for unlimited
and immediate fulfillment for the 100% fill rate case under both scenarios, we set up
appropriate target base-stock levels for the less-than-100% fill rate case. For uniform
demand distribution, we compute the target base stock levels using the “UniformSumDistribution” function in Mathematica 8. For normal demand distribution, we
calculate the target base-stock levels as described in Chapter 2. The results are provided in Table 3.2. We conduct simulations for each scenario and fill rate using these
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supplier target base-stock levels.
Table 3.2: Supplier Target Base-Stock Levels

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate

Single Market
Scenario 1a Scenario 1b
786
786
804
804
828
828

Two Markets
Scenario 2a Scenario 2b
1611
1542
1635
1572
1665
1611

For Scenario 1a, we start with the analytical model for the single buyer case, where
consumer demand in each period is independent and follows a uniform distribution
(i.e., Dt ∼ U [u1 , u2 ]). Equation (3.7) can be solved as follows:
F (SB∗ − E[N ]) =

b
SB∗ − E[N ] − u1
=
u2 − u1
h+b

⇒ SB∗ − E[N ] − u1 = (u2 − u1 ) ·

b
h+b

u2 b + u1 h
+ E[N ]
h+b
u2 b + u1 h
=
+ (1 − β) · µD
h+b
u1 h + u2 b
u1 + u2
=
+ (1 − β) ·
h+b
2

SB∗ =

(3.8)

Thus, for instance, for Dt ∼ U [131, 269], h = 0.15 and b = 0.45, β = 0.85, the
heuristic base-stock level is: SB∗ =

131(0.15)+269(0.45)
+(1
0.15+0.45

− 0.85)· 131+269
= 264.5 ≈ 265.
2

We conduct 100 replications of simulations, and record the optimal base-stock levels
for the buyer. The average optimal base-stock levels from numerical simulations
for 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100% are 275.85, 263.15, 252.23, 232.61, respectively. We
compare these values with the base-stock levels that are calculated from Equation
(3.8), which give 274.5, 264.5, 234.5, 240.4, respectively. The results are summarized
in Table 3.3. For the 80% and 85% fill rate cases, one sample t-test shows that
the values obtained from numerical simulations are not significantly different (at
p = 0.05 level) from the values calculated from the model. For the 90% and 100%
cases, although the null hypotheses are rejected (at p = 0.05 level), the simulated
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values are close to the theoretical results. Considering the difference in analytical
and simulation settings4 , our heuristic seems to work well as a good approximation
to the optimal base stock levels under the uniform (i.e., a linear) demand distribution.
Table 3.3: Scenario 1a Simulation Results vs. Heuristic Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Mean
275.85
263.15
252.23
232.61

Simulation Results
Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
18.62
100
1.86
15.20
100
1.52
11.21
100
1.12
5.48
100
0.55

Heuristic Results
SB∗
274.5
264.5
254.5
234.5

For Scenario 1b, we start with the analytical model for the single buyer case, where
consumer demand in each period is independent and follows a normal distribution
2
(i.e., Dt ∼ N (µD , σD
)). Equation (3.7) can be solved as follows:

"

SB∗

#

b
− E[N ] = F
h+b
"
#
b
⇒ SB∗ = F −1
+ E[N ]
h+b
"
#
b
−1
= F
+ (1 − β) · µD
h+b
−1

(3.9)

For instance, for Dt ∼ N (200, 402 ), h = 0.15 and b = 0.45, β = 0.85, the heuristic
base-stock level from Equation (3.9) is: SB∗ = F −1

h

0.45
0.45+0.15

i

+ (1 − 0.85) · 200 =

256.98 ≈ 257. For numerical simulations, we conduct 100 replications, and record
the optimal base-stock levels for the buyer. The average optimal base-stock levels
from numerical simulations for 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100% are 277.92, 264.15, 250.56,
226.29, respectively. We compare these values with the base-stock levels that are calculated from Equation (3.9), which give 266.98, 256.98, 246.98, 226.98, respectively.
The results are summarized in Table 3.4. Except for the 100% fill rate case, one sample t-test shows that the values obtained from numerical simulations are significantly
4

Our heuristic is based on an infinite horizon, while the simulation is based on a finite horizon.
The heuristic also does not take the supplier’s lead-time into account, while the simulation does.
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different (at p = 0.05 level) from the values calculated from the model, showing that
our heuristic may be underestimating the optimal base stock levels under the normal
(i.e., a non-linear) demand distribution.
Table 3.4: Scenario 1b Simulation Results vs. Heuristic Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Simulation Results
Mean Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
277.92
21.44
100
2.14
264.15
18.18
100
1.82
250.56
14.23
100
1.42
226.29
6.03
100
0.60

Heuristic Results
SB∗
266.98
256.98
246.98
226.98

For Scenario 2a, we conduct 100 replications of simulations, and obtain the optimal buyer base-stock levels. The average optimal base-stock levels from numerical
simulations for 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100% are 483.2, 472.54, 461.27, 438.94, respectively. Then, through Mathematica calculations, we obtain the heuristic base-stock
levels for the four fill rates using the pooled demand that follows a symmetric triangular distribution shown above. From Equation (3.7), the pooled base-stock levels are
calculated as 480.75, 470.60, 460.50, 440.42, respectively. The results are shown in
Table 3.5. The one sample t-test shows that the values obtained from numerical simulations are not significantly different (at p = 0.05 level) from the values calculated
from the model, validating our analytical results under the uniform distribution.
Table 3.5: Scenario 2a Simulation Results vs. Heuristic Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Simulation Results
Mean Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
483.20
15.51
100
1.55
472.54
15.82
100
1.58
461.27
13.32
100
1.33
438.94
8.40
100
0.84

Heuristic Results
SB∗
480.75
470.60
460.50
440.42

For Scenario 2b, we also conduct 100 replications of simulations, and obtain the
optimal buyer base-stock levels. The average optimal base-stock levels from numerical simulations for 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100% are 541.06, 513.97, 484.80, 436.63,
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respectively. Then, as shown in Scenario 1b, we compute the heuristic base-stock levels for the four fill rates using the pooled demand that follows a normal distribution
√
2
); µD = 400, σD = 40 2). From Equation (3.7), the pooled base(Dt ∼ N (µD , σD
stock levels are calculated as 518.15, 498.15, 478.15, 438.15, respectively. The results
are shown in Table 3.6. Consistent with our results in Scenario 1b, except for the
100% fill rate case, the one sample t-test shows that the values obtained from numerical simulations are significantly different (at p = 0.05 level) from the values calculated
from the model, once again showing that our heuristic may be underestimating the
optimal base stock levels under the normal demand distribution.
Table 3.6: Scenario 2b Simulation Results vs. Heuristic Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Mean
541.06
513.97
484.80
436.63

Simulation Results
Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
30.77
100
3.08
28.93
100
2.89
23.64
100
2.36
8.32
100
0.83

Heuristic Results
SB∗
518.15
498.15
478.15
438.15

Mathematically, the second scenario is identical to a centralized two-buyers case,
where the shared goal of the buyers is to maximize the two buyers’ total profit. We
next analyze the case of two independent buyers, which corresponds to the decentralized two-buyers case.

3.3

Analysis of the Two-Buyer Case

In this section, we focus on the case of two independent buyers, who do not compete
in the end market (i.e., they serve independent demand streams) but optimize their
individual profits and are sourced from the same supplier as in Chapter 2. To make
the problem tractable, we only analyze the uniform allocation scenario, where the
supplier allocates inventory equally between the two buyers if the sum of the orders
exceeds available inventory.
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While we do not provide analytical results for this case due to analytical complexity, we use numerical simulation to understand the optimal base-stock levels of
the buyers to compare against the empirical observations from the lab experiments in
the next chapter. The simulation assumes the same target base-stock level for each
buyer as an equilibrium solution.5
We first conduct simulation for the case where consumer demand for each market
follows an independent and identical uniform distribution in each period (Scenario
3a). The average optimal base-stock levels for each buyer obtained through simulations for 80%, 85%, 90%, and 100% fill rate from the supplier are 252.17, 247.32,
243, 233.09, respectively. The results are shown in Table 3.7. These values are higher
than the values in the centralized buyers’ case above (for a single buyer/market, 241.6,
236.27, 230.64, 219.47, respectively), indicating that centralization helps reduce the
inventory levels in the supply chain, as expected.
Table 3.7: Scenario 3a Simulation Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Simulation Results
Mean Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
252.17
7.34
100
0.734
247.32
6.74
100
0.674
243.00
6.18
100
0.618
233.09
3.76
100
0.376

Finally, we consider the case where consumer demand for each market follows an
2
independent and identical normal distribution in each period (∼ N (µD , σD
); µD =

200, σD = 40) (Scenario 3b). From numerical simulations, the average optimal buyer
base-stock levels for the four fill rate cases are found as 277.38, 263.99, 249.85, 226.04,
respectively. The results are provided in Table 3.8.
Although we cannot claim that a static base stock policy is optimal over a finite horizon under uniform capacity allocation, the base-stock level under 85% fill
5
We investigated each buyer’s best response to a number of different ordering strategies from
the other buyer, and the base stock policy proved to give the highest profits for both buyers.
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Table 3.8: Scenario 3b Simulation Results

80% Fill Rate
85% Fill Rate
90% Fill Rate
100% Fill Rate

Mean
277.38
263.99
249.85
226.04

Simulation Results
Std. Dev. Count Std. Err.
15.07
100
1.51
12.99
100
1.30
10.94
100
1.09
4.11
100
0.41

rate (263.99 ≈ 264) given in Table 3.8 provides us a benchmark to compare against
the empirical observations in the next chapter. We also note that the single buyer
heuristic results provide a reasonable approximation for the two independent buyers case. In particular, when we compare the base stock levels obtained from the
heuristic under normal distribution (Table 3.4) against the optimal base stock levels
from numerical simulation in Table 3.8, we find that the resulting profit loss ranges
from 0.02% to 0.23%, given a supplier fill rate of 85%, which is relatively small.6
Thus, we conclude that our heuristic base stock level is a reasonable approximation
to the buyers’ equilibrium base stock level, which motivates us to use Equation (3.7)
in estimating perceived cost ratios in the next chapter.

3.4

Conclusions

In this chapter, we characterized a buyer’s optimal base stock level in a two-stage
supply chain, considering a similar framework as in Chapter 2, using analytical and
numerical simulation approaches. We first presented a single-buyer base-stock inventory model with a supplier that provides 100% fill rate and then one that provides
less than 100% fill rate. Next, we compared our theoretical results to numerical
simulations for both uniformly and normally distributed consumer demand. The results showed that our heuristic approximation (Equation (3.7)) estimates the optimal
6

The comparison between the simulated optimal base stock level and the heuristic base stock
level is conducted using the realized demand streams in the experiments across 39 buyer pairs.
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base-stock levels well for uniformly distributed demand, but may underestimate for
normally distributed demand. We then utilized a numerical simulation approach for
the two-buyer case, where the supplier allocates inventory equally between the two
buyers if the orders exceed available inventory, for both uniformly and normally distributed consumer demand. In Chapter 4, we use the simulation results from this
scenario (Scenario 3b) as a theoretical benchmark against the actual buyer ordering
behavior observed in our behavioral experiments in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 4
Investigating Buyers’ Ordering Behavior
in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
4.1

Introduction

In many industries with high capacity expansion costs, a supplier who serves multiple
buyers may have to allocate limited capacity to each buyer instead of expanding
capacity. Inventory rationing has been considered as one of the causes of the bullwhip
effect, a phenomenon frequently observed in supply chains where the demand and
order variabilities are amplified as one moves up in the supply chain (Lee et al., 1997a).
When supply shortage is expected, buyers may also inflate order quantity beyond
what they need if they anticipate that they will not be able to receive what they
order (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999b). Hewlett-Packard (Lee et al., 1997a), Proctor
& Gamble (Lee et al., 1997a), and many firms in the semiconductor manufacturing
industry (Terwiesch et al., 2005) have suffered due to the presence of inflated or
“phantom” orders that do not quite reflect the “true” demand.
A supplier’s capacity allocation mechanism can affect the buyers’ order inflation
behavior. Suppliers can choose to allocate their scarce capacity equally among their
buyers (i.e., uniform allocation policy), or do it in proportion to the actual orders
placed by the buyers (i.e., proportional allocation policy) (Cachon and Lariviere,
1999a). Using a single period inventory model, Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) analytically show that under uniform allocation policy from the supplier, buyers do not
inflate order quantity even when supply shortage is expected, while under propor-

58

tional allocation policy buyers inflate order quantity as allocation is proportional to
their order quantity. Under these circumstances, one would expect rational buyers
to follow these behaviors in practice. However, to the best of our knowledge, the
impact of uniform allocation mechanism on reducing the order inflation behavior has
not been investigated empirically in the literature. In this study, we investigate in
a behavioral context how buyers make their ordering decisions when inventory rationing exists. In particular, since uniform allocation policies have been shown to be
“truth-inducing” in analytical models, we investigate the effect of uniform allocation
on buyers’ ordering behavior. Analytical models typically assume that buyers are
fully aware of the supplier’s allocation policy. However, in practice, suppliers may
not entirely disclose their allocation policies to their buyers (Krishnan et al., 2007),
affecting buyers’ behavior. Thus, we also investigate the impact of the supplier’s
communication about his allocation policy.
Most analytical studies based on economic theory and several empirical methodologies such as structural estimation modeling assume rational buyers who make optimal decisions, while behavioral operations management (OM) literature has shown
that human decisions often deviate from the optimum. When we compare the benchmark results from the previous chapter with the actual decisions of the buyers in our
experiments (from Chapter 2), we find that “human” buyers mark a lower profit performance, where the loss ranges from 0.8% to 14.1%, suggesting that human buyers
are not fully rational. Thus, consistent with the findings in the behavioral OM literature, we find that buyers are prone to make suboptimal ordering decisions. From
this result, a question arises: What factors affect buyers’ ordering decisions? In this
chapter, to address this question, we analyze the buyers’ ordering behavior using
maximum likelihood estimation and structural estimation modeling techniques.
We first investigate whether buyers underweight the supply line, i.e., do not fully
consider the on-order quantity from the supplier, using a maximum likelihood estima-
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tion approach. We indeed find that regardless of the information disclosure, buyers
significantly underweight the supply line. In addition, buyers tend to place a higher
weight on the previous period’s demand in their ordering decisions when they do not
have any information on the allocation policy. This consistently holds in both the
initial and later periods of the game.
We next estimate buyers’ perceived cost ratios (the ratio between inventory holding cost and backlogging cost) using structural estimation modeling, and investigate
the factors that affect these ratios. We find that when buyers do not have information
about the allocation policy, they seem to be putting more weight on the inventory
holding cost compared to the case with information. Moreover, consistent with the
findings for supply line underweighting, our analyses show that when information on
the allocation policy is not disclosed, the effect of the state factors on the perceived
cost ratios is generally larger than the case with information; however, the differences
become negligible over time as the decisions stabilize.

4.2

Literature Review

The bullwhip effect refers to the amplification in order variability as one moves upstream in the supply chain from retail to the source of production. Existing studies
attribute the bullwhip effect to both operational and behavioral causes. Operational
causes refer to structural elements that cause rational supply chain members to amplify demand variation (Croson et al., 2014). Lee et al. (1997b) identify four operational sources of the bullwhip effect: demand signal processing, inventory rationing
and shortage gaming, order batching, and price variations. Theoretically, if only operational causes induce the bullwhip effect, once these operational causes are removed,
the bullwhip effect should no longer be observed. However, even when those operational causes are all removed, the bullwhip effect is still observed in lab experiments
using the classical four-echelon beer game (Croson and Donohue, 2003, 2006). Cro-
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son and Donohue (2006) attribute this phenomenon to “underweighting the supply
line,” where players may not account for the previous orders that have not yet been
received from their supplier (“on-order quantity” in this chapter) when placing orders
in the next period (Sterman, 1989). In addition, while demand information sharing
between supply chain partners has been widely agreed to mitigate the bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 1997b), the tendency of underweighting the supply line is observed
even when the point-of-sales data is shared under common knowledge of uniformly
distributed demand (Croson and Donohue, 2003). Moreover, while shorter lead time
(i.e., shorter supply line) results in reductions in inventory holding and backorder
costs (Steckel et al., 2004), the bullwhip effect and the supply line underweighting
are still detected even with zero lead time and without serial demand correlations
(Zhao and Zhao, 2015).
Another related research stream is on capacity allocation policies, where a supplier
needs to make an allocation decision when the total demand from his buyers exceeds
available inventory. In “individually responsive” policies such as proportional, a buyer
can receive a larger allocation by placing a larger order, which motivates the buyer
to act strategically and inflate her order (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999a,b). On the
other hand, with uniform allocation, truth-telling behavior is shown to be a dominant
Nash equilibrium (NE) and there is no order inflation. Behavioral studies on capacity
allocation focus on proportional allocation mechanisms in one-shot games, and find
that NE exaggerates buyers’ tendency to strategically order more than they need.
Chen et al. (2012) and Chen and Zhao (2015) develop a behavioral model based on
the quantal response equilibrium under deterministic and stochastic demand, respectively, while Cui and Zhang (2017) propose a behavioral model based on cognitive
hierarchy theory. To the best of our knowledge, uniform allocation mechanism has
not been empirically investigated in a behavioral context, which we do in this study.
In Chapter 2, we showed that the bullwhip effect is reduced when the allocation pol-
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icy is communicated. Also, we discussed the results of a fixed-effects regression to
demonstrate that buyers underweight the supply line. In this chapter, we investigate
this further for uniform allocation using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
In addition to the over-ordering and supply line underweighting behavior of buyers, the rationality of supply chain players is frequently studied in the behavioral OM
literature. Based on studies in the experimental economics and the psychology of
individual choices under bounded rationality, Sterman (1989) shows that individual
decisions in a beer game systematically deviate from the optimal behavior based on
existing analytical inventory models. Consistent to anchoring and insufficient adjustment pattern, one of the human decision making heuristics shown by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), Sterman (1989) finds that the desired stock levels of buyers strongly anchor to their initial choice and that buyers tend to make insufficient
adjustments due to the failure of adequately accounting for the supply line. Building on these findings, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) provide two explanations using
anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristics (i.e., demand-chasing and mean anchoring) about how managers actually make ordering decisions that deviate from the
expected profit-maximizing quantity. Gavirneni and Xia (2009) investigate various
buyer order-anchoring patterns of newsvendors in a behavioral experiment, and observe that buyers tend to choose an anchor that is close to the optimum. Considering
service level contracts, Bolton et al. (2016) examine whether buyers’ ordering decisions anchor to the contracted commitment quantity, and do not find a significant
anchoring pattern. However, interpreting its directional consistency, they suspect
that if there was an anchoring at the beginning of the experimental periods, buyers might have learned over time and appropriately adjusted their decisions. In this
chapter, we also show that human buyers are not necessarily fully rational by comparing the profit performances between the simulated buyers with optimized target
base-stock policies and the human buyers in the behavioral experiments. In addition,
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to identify the factors that influence the decisions of buyers, we estimate the (perceived) overage/underage cost ratios of buyers using structural estimation modeling,
and investigate how the perceived cost ratio is influenced by various factors.
Over the last decade, the usage of structural estimation modeling framework to
estimate behavioral parameters of interest has increased in the area of behavioral
OM. The parameters estimated in the behavioral OM literature include (1) overage/underage cost ratios (Olivares et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2010), (2) the level of strategic thinking of buyers (Cui and Zhang, 2017), (3) willingness-to-pay for eliminating
the supply and demand mismatch (Kremer and Wassenhove, 2014), (4) distributional
and peer-induced fairness (Ho et al., 2014), (5) experience-weighted attraction model
parameters (Feng and Zhang, 2017), and (6) reference points in revenue sharing contracts (Becker-Peth and Thonemann, 2016). Using a healthcare application within
the newsvendor context, Olivares et al. (2008) find that the hospital of focus in their
study tends to perceive the costs of OR idle time (i.e., overage) as approximately 60%
higher, on the average, than the cost of schedule overruns and long working times for
their staff (i.e., underage). Also in a newsvendor context, Ho et al. (2010) propose
a new behavioral model with reference dependence, incorporating the psychological
costs of leftover (i.e., overage) and stockouts (i.e., underage), and show that the psychological cost of a leftover is 1.53 times greater than the psychological cost of a
stockout. In this chapter, we structurally estimate the overage/underage cost ratios
for each individual and each period in a two-stage supply chain, and investigate how
the perceived cost ratios of buyers are influenced by various factors such as state
variables (e.g., on-order quantity, on-hand inventory, backlog), information on the
supplier’s capacity allocation policy, and learning over time.
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4.3

Research Approach and Results

In the previous chapter, we derived base stock levels for buyers through numerical
simulation to use as a benchmark for the ordering behavior observed in our experiments. Although we cannot claim that a static base stock policy is optimal over a
finite horizon under uniform capacity allocation, these base-stock levels still provide
an “approximately optimal” strategy for a rational buyer. In this chapter, we show
how actual ordering behaviors deviate from these benchmark ordering strategies and
the resulting deterioration in the achieved profits. In order to investigate why buyers
are prone to suboptimal decisions, we also estimate the perceived overage (inventory
holding) vs. underage (backlogging) cost ratios for each player (and each period)
using structural estimation modeling, and further investigate the factors that affect
this ratio using fixed-effect regression analyses.

4.3.1

Model Structure and Key Notation

In our model, consistent with the previous chapters, both the supplier and buyers
place orders following a base-stock policy. The supplier’s production lead time is
assumed to be 4 periods, while delivery time to the buyer is negligible and assumed
to be zero. When the supplier receives orders from the buyers, the orders are fulfilled
immediately from the supplier’s on-hand inventory, while unfulfilled orders are backlogged, referred to as the on-order quantity, to be fulfilled in the next periods. Key
notation for this chapter are provided in Table 4.1.

4.3.2

Comparison against theoretical results

At the beginning of each period, each buyer places an order to raise her inventory
position back to the target base-stock level, SB . Since the supplier employs a basestock policy with a non-zero lead time, the buyer order in each period may not be
fulfilled immediately. Consequently, the buyer may not have enough on-hand inven64

Table 4.1: Key Notation
Notation
SB
p
c
h
b
β
Dt
Ot
Rt
Nt
ILt :
IPt :
It :
Bt :
πt

Definition
Buyer’s base-stock level
Unit revenue (selling price)
Unit procurement cost
Unit inventory holding cost
Unit backlogging cost
Supplier’s target fill-rate to the buyer (0 < β ≤ 1)
Consumer demand realized by the buyer in period t
Order quantity placed by the buyer at the beginning of period t
Received shipment by the buyer at the beginning of period t
On-order quantity the supplier owes the buyer at the end of period t
Inventory level of the buyer at the beginning of period t
Inventory position of the buyer before placing an order in period t
On-hand inventory of buyer i at the end of period t
Backlog of buyer i at the end of period t
Buyer’s profit for period t

tory to fulfill consumer demand. The buyer backlogs any unmet consumer demand
incurring a unit backlogging cost, b, to fulfill in the next periods. In case there is
leftover inventory after serving demand at the end of each period, the inventory is
carried over to the next period with unit inventory holding cost, h.
2
In Chapter 3, using normally distributed consumer demand (∼ N (µD , σD
); µD =

200, σD = 40), unit selling price of p = $2, unit procurement cost of c = $1, unit
inventory-holding cost of h = $0.15, and unit backlogging cost of b = $0.45, and
supplier’s fill rate of β = 85%, we obtained the optimal (static) target base-stock
level as 264 through numerical simulation. To compare the profit performances of
this benchmark base-stock policy and the actual buyer behavior in our experiments,
we first calculate the total profit for each pair of buyers in the experiments. Then,
using the same demand streams that the buyers faced during the experiments, we
calculate the profit performances of the base-stock ordering policy (with the static
target base-stock level of 264) for each pair of buyers from the simulation. For profit
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comparisons, we look into NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments, introduced in Chapter
2. Recall that NI/UNI is the uniform allocation treatment without information
about the allocation policy, while I/UNI is that with information. For the NI/UNI
treatment, using a two-tailed paired t-test, we find that the profit difference between experiments and the simulation is statistically significant (p < 0.0001). In
particular, the lowest total profit obtained in the simulation across all demand scenarios is 18,926.5, while the highest total profit that any buyer pair achieved in the
experiments was 18,827.6. We further look into each individual player’s profit performance, and find that only one buyer out of the 38 buyers1 could achieve slightly
higher profits than the simulation results (0.4%).2 For the I/UNI treatment, using
a two-tailed paired t-test, we find that the profit difference between experiments and
the simulation is also statistically significant (p < 0.0001). The lowest total profit
obtained in the simulation across all demand scenarios is 18,893.8, while the highest
total profit that any buyer pair achieved in the experiments was 18,814.5. We also
look into each individual player’s profit performance, and find that only three buyers
out of the 40 buyers could achieve slightly higher profits than the simulation results
(0.2%, 0.3%, 0.7%, respectively). Summary statistics for buyers’ profit performances
in the simulations vs. experiments under both treatments are provided in Table 4.2.3
In summary, we find that the human buyers in the experiments had lower profits
than the simulated buyers in the range of 0.8% to 14.1%.4 We next investigate the
drivers of the buyers’ ordering behavior.
1

Note that we include one additional pair in this chapter which was removed in Chapter 2 due
to significantly inflated forecasts. Since the ordering decisions did not show any anomalies, we chose
to include them in the ordering behavior analysis.
2

Note that each buyer’s decisions are affected by the other buyer’s decisions in the experiment,
given the supplier’s allocation policy, while the simulation is based on an “equilibrium” assumption.
3

As discussed in Chapter 2, the difference in profit performances of the buyers in our experiments
under NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments is not statistically significant (p = 0.2725) using a two-tailed
heteroskedastic t-test due to the unequal variances.
4

Specifically, 0.8% to 12.7% for NI/UNI treatment, and 1.1% to 14.1% for I/UNI treatment.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Total Buyer Profits in Experiments vs. Simulations
NI/UNI (19 buyer pairs)
Max
Min
Median
Mean
Simulation 19,043.1 18,926.5 18,980.6 18,986.3
Experiments 18,827.6 16,561.1 18,345.3 18,154.8
I/UNI (20 buyer pairs)
Max
Min
Median
Mean
Simulation 19,040.9 18,893.8 18,993.4 18,993.5
Experiments 18,814.5 16,228.8 18,503.4 18,357.7
4.3.3

Std. Dev.
24.63
570.4
Std. Dev.
36.4
566.7

Supply Line Underweighting

We first investigate whether subjects underweight the supply line using the experiments from Chapter 2 with uniform allocation. A base stock policy could have been
optimal for the buyers in the absence of inventory rationing (a buyer’s order is not
guaranteed to be fully met under a capacity allocation policy). Let SB denote the
base stock level for the buyers. Note that buyers need to make a decision before consumer demand is realized. After placing an order equal to the base stock level (SB∗ )
in period 1, buyer i would order enough to raise his inventory position (IPitb ) back
to the target base stock level in each period, given by the demand of the previous
period (Di,t−1 ):
b
Oit = SB∗ − IPi,t−1
+ Di,t−1

for i = 1, 2; t = 2, ..., T

(4.1)

We can rewrite (4.1) as:
Oit = SB∗ − ILbi,t−1 + Di,t−1 − Ri,t−1 − Ni,t−1

for i = 1, 2; t = 2, ..., T

(4.2)

where ILbit = Ii,t−1 −Bi,t−1 denotes buyer i’s inventory level at the beginning of period
t. Since we do not know the base stock level chosen by a buyer, we can write the
estimation problem for (4.2), utilizing the notation in Croson and Donohue (2006)
and Niranjan et al. (2011), as follows:
Oit = α0 + αI ILbi,t−1 + αD Di,t−1 + αR Ri,t−1 + αN Ni,t−1 + ε
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(4.3)

for i = 1, 2; t = 2, ..., T . We can also write a modified version of this equation replacing (αI ILbt−1 ) with (αI+ It−2 + αI− Bt−2 ) to estimate the effects of on-hand inventory
and backlog separately:
Oit = α0 + αI+ It−2 + αI− Bt−2 + αD Di,t−1 + αR Ri,t−1 + αN Ni,t−1 + ε

(4.4)

for i = 1, 2; t = 2, ..., T . In theory, it should hold that αI = αR = αN = −1 and
αD = 1, while if underweighting the supply line exists, we should find αN > αI and
−1 < αN < 0.
Supply Line Underweighting - All Periods of the Game

We estimate Equations (4.3) and (4.4) using maximum likelihood estimation. We use
clustered standard errors at the buyer-pair level to control for the pair-level effects, in
addition to controlling for individual-level and period-level fixed effects. The results
are given in Table 4.3.
We observe that all coefficients have signs consistent with the formulation. We
first investigate the coefficient of on-order quantity, αN , to see the extent of the
supply line underweighting. While the magnitude of the coefficient is similar between
NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments, it is statistically significant for the latter but not
for the former.5 Overall, the coefficient is closer to 0 than −1; i.e., significantly
smaller than the theorized effect. We test whether the αN estimate is significantly
different from −1 using a two-tailed t-test, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis
under both treatments.6 We next test whether αN is significantly greater than αI ,
5

For the αN estimate under I/UNI treatment, p = 0.046 for Eqn. (4.3) and p = 0.063 for
Eqn. (4.4), while under NI/UNI treatment, p = 0.761 for Eqn. (4.3) and p = 0.776 for Eqn. (4.4).
Moreover, the difference in the coefficients between the two treatments is not statistically significant.
The z-statistic is 0.038 for Eqn. (4.3) and 0.001 for Eqn. (4.4). Both z-statistics are smaller than
the z-critical value, 1.645, at α = 0.1 level.
6

Under I/UNI treatment, t-statistic is 149.65 for Eqn. (4.3) and 164.26 for Eqn. (4.4), while
under NI/UNI treatment, 24.35 for Eqn. (4.3) and 23.95 for Eqn. (4.4). All four t-statistics are
greater than the t-critical value, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level.
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Table 4.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Equations (4.3)-(4.4) for All Periods

Di,t−1
Ri,t−1
Ni,t−1
ILi,t−1
Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2

(4.3)
NI/UNI
I/UNI
0.871***
0.640***
(0.0794)
(0.0762)
-0.306***
-0.0995
(0.0499)
(0.0657)
-0.0125
-0.0141**
(0.0406)
(0.00659)
-0.383***
-0.178***
(0.0353)
(0.0330)
-

-

(4.4)
NI/UNI
I/UNI
0.868***
0.681***
(0.0811)
(0.0752)
-0.307***
-0.115*
(0.0498)
(0.0604)
-0.0119
-0.0119*
(0.0413)
(0.00602)
-0.394***
(0.0392)
0.362***
(0.0981)
75.96***
(19.91)
1824
0.452

-0.164***
(0.0302)
0.370***
(0.0659)
125.02***
(25.13)
1920
0.215

74.51***
138.59***
(18.10)
(22.61)
N
1824
1920
2
0.452
0.211
Adj.R
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered robust standard errors (pair-level) are in parentheses.
Intercept

and the difference is statistically significant.7 Thus, buyers underweight the supply
line even when uniform allocation policy is implemented with communication.
We next observe that the coefficient of the inventory level, αI , is significantly different between the two treatments.8 A closer look into Equation (4.4) reveals that the
difference is primarily from the effect of on-hand inventory while the effect of backlog
seems similar. In particular, buyers seem to put a higher weight on on-hand inventory
levels when they do not have information about the allocation policy. We also observe
7

Consistent with the literature, Eqn. (4.3) is used for comparison: z-statistics under I/UNI
treatment is 4.88, while under NI/UNI treatment 6.88. Both z-statistics are greater than z-critical
value, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level.
8

The z-statistic for αI is 4.23, greater than the z-critical value, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level. The
z-statistic is 4.64 for αI+ , and 0.068 for αI− .
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differences in the coefficients of previous demand9 and received shipment10 in both
equations. Under a base-stock policy with a fully reliable supplier, once the target
base-stock level is reached, the ordering decision in each period is to place an order
that equals the previous period’s demand, which is not necessarily the case under a
supplier with less than 100% fill rate. Our results from a two-tailed t-test show that
under I/UNI treatment, the coefficient of demand (αD ) is significantly different from
1 (t-statistic: 4.72 > t-critical: 2.58 at p = 0.01 level), while under NI/UNI treatment, the coefficient of demand is not significantly different from 1 (t-statistic: 1.62
< t-critical: 2.58). Thus, buyers seem to rely more on the previous period’s demand
when they do not have any information on the allocation policy.11
As a robustness check, we also compare the coefficients between the two treatments
using regression models involving full interaction terms between the communication
dummy variable and the independent variables in Equations (4.3) and (4.4), and
obtain results consistent with z-tests.12
9

The difference in the coefficients under NI/UNI treatment and I/UNI treatment is statistically significant for Eqn. (4.3) and marginally significant for Eqn. (4.4). For Eqn. (4.3), the
z-statistic is 2.09, which is greater than the z-critical value, 1.96, at α = 0.05 level. For Eqn. (4.4),
the z-statistic is 1.70, greater than the z-critical value, 1.65, at α = 0.1 level.
10

The z-statistic is 2.50 for Eqn. (4.3), and 2.44 for Eqn. (4.4). Both z-statistics are greater than
the z-critical value, 1.96, at α = 0.05 level.
11

We test for multi-collinearity by checking variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent
variables in both equations. The maximum VIFs in both equations do not exceed 3, considerably
less than the rule of thumb of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). The mean VIFs in Equations (4.3) and (4.4)
under NI/UNI are 2.03 and 2.02, and under I/UNI treatment are 2.00 and 2.02. These results
indicate that multi-collinearity does not constitute a serious issue in either model.
12

In Eqn. (4.3), the coefficients of inventory level, demand, and received shipment are significantly
or marginally significantly different (with p-values of 0.022, 0.067, 0.059, respectively), while the
coefficients of on-order quantity do not differ significantly (with a p-value of 0.306). In Eqn. (4.4),
the differences in the coefficients of on-hand inventory, demand, and received shipment are significant
or marginally significant (with p-values of 0.016, 0.072, 0.085, respectively), while the differences in
the coefficients of backlog and on-order are not significant (with p-values of 0.380 and 0.215).
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Supply Line Underweighting - Second Half of the Game

As shown in Chapter 2, since the second half of the game (i.e., periods 26-50) provides
more stable results, we next concentrate our analysis on the second half of the game
only. The maximum likelihood estimation results using Equations (4.3)-(4.4) are
provided in Table 4.4. Consistent with the all-periods analysis, we use clustered
standard errors at the buyer-pair level to control for the pair-level effects, and control
for the period-level and individual-level fixed effects.
Table 4.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Equations (4.3)-(4.4) for 2nd Half

Di,t−1
Ri,t−1
Ni,t−1
ILi,t−1
Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2

(4.3)
NI/UNI
I/UNI
0.857***
0.726***
(0.0995)
(0.101)
-0.410***
-0.383***
(0.0599)
(0.0570)
-0.117**
-0.0788
(0.0471)
(0.0889)
-0.435***
-0.424***
(0.0507)
(0.0716)
-

-

(4.4)
NI/UNI
I/UNI
0.854***
0.725***
(0.0994)
(0.102)
-0.410***
-0.383***
(0.0603)
(0.0560)
-0.104**
-0.0775
(0.0469)
(0.0917)
-0.475***
(0.0699)
0.332***
(0.0930)
123.04***
(17.67)
950
0.511

-0.428***
(0.0802)
0.409***
(0.0623)
177.68***
(21.76)
1000
0.452

118.04***
177.25***
(19.02)
(20.95)
N
950
1000
2
Adj.R
0.507
0.452
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered robust standard errors (pair-level) are in parentheses.
Intercept

We again find that all coefficients have signs consistent with the formulation.
Moreover, the differences in the coefficients between the two treatments become insignificant in “steady state.”13 This indicates that providing information on the al13

In Eqn. (4.3), the z-statistics for Di,t−1 , Ri,t−1 , Ni,t−1 , and ILi,t−1 are 0.920, 0.323, 0.377,
0.115, respectively. In Eqn. (4.4), the z-statistics for Di,t−1 , Ri,t−1 , Ni,t−1 , Ii,t−1 , and Bi,t−1 are
0.902, 0.319, 0.260, 0.447, 0.688, respectively. All nine z-statistics are smaller than the z-critical
value, 1.65, at α = 0.1 level, indicating that the differences are no longer significant in the 2nd half.

71

location policy affects buyers’ ordering behavior more prominently in the early stages
of the game, where buyers are still learning, while the differences become smaller
over time as the target base-stock levels gradually stabilize. We provide graphs of the
buyers’ average inventory positions under NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments over 50
periods in Figure 4.1. We observe that the inventory positions for both treatments
fluctuate around the simulated optimum, i.e., 264, in the second half of the game.
As a robustness check, we also test the differences in the coefficients between the
two treatments using regression models extended from Equations (4.3) and (4.4) with
full interaction terms, and obtain the same results.14

I/UNI

350
300
250
200

Target Inventory Position

400

NI/UNI

0

50

0

50

Experimental Periods
Graphs by design_no

Figure 4.1: Buyers’ Average Inventory Positions under NI/UNI and I/UNI Treatments
14

In Eqn. (4.3), the coefficients of inventory level, demand, received shipment, and on-order
quantity are not significantly different between the two treatments (with p-values of 0.829, 0.420,
0.429, 0.614, respectively). In Eqn. (4.4), the differences in the coefficients of on-hand inventory,
backlog, demand, received shipment, and on-order quantity are not significant (with p-values of
0.716, 0.702, 0.421, 0.459, 0.735, respectively).
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We also test whether αN estimate is significantly different from −1 using a twotailed t-test, and find that the null hypothesis is rejected under both treatments.15
We then test whether αN is significantly greater than αI , and find that the difference
is statistically significant.16 Thus, even in the second half of the game with more
stable inventory positions, buyers continue to underweight the supply line.
We also observe that the coefficient of demand (αD ) under I/UNI treatment is
higher in the second half, while a two-tailed t-test still shows that the coefficient
is statistically significantly different from 1 (t-statistic: 2.71 > t-critical: 2.58 at
p = 0.01 level), which is not the case under NI/UNI treatment (t-statistic: 1.44 < tcritical: 2.58 at p = 0.01 level), consistent with the all-periods analysis. Although the
difference in the coefficients between the two treatments is not statistically significant,
these results suggest that buyers may continue to rely on the previous period’s demand
slightly more when they do not have any information on the allocation policy.17

4.3.4

Buyers’ Perceived Cost Ratios

In Chapter 3, we showed that a single buyer’s heuristic base-stock level over an infinite
horizon satisfies:
F (SB∗ − E [N ]) =

b
=
h+b

h
b

1
.
+1

(4.5)

In addition, from Tables 3.4 and 3.8, we observe that the optimal base-stock levels
based on numerical simulations in the single-buyer (1b) and the two-buyer (3b) sce15

Under I/UNI treatment, t-statistics are 10.37 for Eqn. (4.3) and 10.05 for Eqn. (4.4), while
under NI/UNI treatment, 18.77 for Eqn. (4.3) and 19.10 for Eqn. (4.4). These four t-statistics
are all greater than the t-critical value, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level.
16

As in the all-periods analysis, consistent with literature, Eqn. (4.3) is used for the comparison:
z-statistic under I/UNI treatment is 3.03, while under NI/UNI treatment 4.59. Both z-statistics
are greater than the z-critical value, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level.
17

We also check VIFs for the independent variables in both equations to test multi-collinearity.
The maximum VIFs in both equations is 3.36, considerably less than the rule of thumb 10 (Kutner
et al., 2004). In addition, the mean VIFs in Equations (4.3) and (4.4) under NI/UNI are 2.06 and
2.06, and under I/UNI treatment 2.05 and 2.05. Thus, these results indicate that multi-collinearity
does not constitute a serious issue in either model.
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narios are similar. Moreover, when we compare the base stock levels obtained from
the heuristic in Table 3.4 against the optimal base stock levels from numerical simulation in Table 3.8, we find that the resulting profit loss ranges from 0.02% to 0.23%,
given a supplier fill rate of 85%, which is relatively small. Thus, we conclude that
our heuristic base stock level is a reasonable approximation to the buyers’ equilibrium base stock level, which motivates us to use Equation (3.7) in estimating buyers’
perceived cost ratios in this chapter.
Using data from our behavioral experiments, we estimate the buyers’ perceived
overage/underage cost ratio,

h
,
b

through structural estimation modeling. We refer

to this cost ratio as γ. Note that the true value of γ in the experiments is

1
3

since

h = $0.15 and b = $0.45. As observed in Equation (4.5) above, we expect the target
base-stock level decisions of buyers to be closely tied to γ. In particular, if a buyer’s
γ value is high (low), the buyer would tend to weight the inventory holding cost more
(less) than the backlogging cost, and be more likely to keep a lower (higher) on-hand
inventory level than she should. With a target inventory position of SB and an onorder quantity of Nt , a buyer’s available-to-serve inventory level in period t is SB −Nt .
Over the course of the game, it is possible that players update their target base stock
levels. Thus, as we fit the inventory model to the experimental data, instead of using
the same static target base stock level for each buyer, we rewrite the heuristic base
stock equation for buyer i in period t as F (Sit − Nit ) =

1
.
γit +1

After transforming the distribution function to a standard normal distribution
(Φ) as:
dβ
Sit − Nit − X
i
F (Sit − Nit ) = P r (D ≤ Sit − Nit ) = Φ
ci
σ

we obtain γit = 
Φ

1
Sit −Nit −Xi β



!

=

1
γit + 1

− 1. In this expression, we need empirical estimates

c

σi

b

dβ, and thus, we use the coefficients vector for β that is
of demand for buyer i, i.e., X
i
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obtained from a rearranged version of Equation (4.4):
Di,t−1 = β0 + βI+ I i,t−2 + βI− Bi,t−2 + βR Ri,t−1 + βN Ni,t−1 + βO Oit + ε

(4.6)

Using this rearranged equation, we run random-effect and fixed-effect regressions
with/without controlling for period-level (time) fixed effects (four regression models).18 Note that the base-stock level is captured by the intercept and error term
in this equation. Additionally, we use the statistics of each individual for Xi . For
√
ci , we use M SE obtained from each of the four regression models, where M SE
σ
denotes mean squared error. For the target base-stock level, Sit , we use the observed
inventory position, and for the on-order quantity, Nit , we use the observed on-order
quantity for buyer i in period t. Thus, using experimental data and standardized
statistics, we obtain γit for buyer i in period t calculating 
Φ

1
Sit −Nit −Xi β



− 1.

c

σi

b

Buyers’ Perceived Cost Ratios - All Periods

For estimating the buyers’ perceived cost ratio, γit , we first validate, using standard
and robust Hausman tests, that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the
random-effects model. Thus, we focus on the results from the fixed-effects models.
Moreover, the R2 value significantly improves when the time fixed effects are controlled for, which holds for both I/UNI and NI/UNI treatments. Thus, we mainly
refer to the γit values obtained through fixed-effects regressions with time fixed effects.
Summary statistics for γit are provided in Table 4.5.
We observe that the mean and standard deviation of γit are very large due to
extreme values. Therefore, we look into median values for our analysis. Under I/UNI
treatment, the median γit value does not significantly differ between with vs. without
time fixed effects, and is fairly close to but slightly smaller than the true value, 13 .
18

This step provides the statistics for demand standardization. Since the coefficients of these
regressions at this stage do not have any meaning (other than the usage for standardization), we do
not include the regression results in this chapter. However, all results are available upon request.
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of γit - All Periods

Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

NI/UNI
Without Time Fixed Effects With Time Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
0.1377
0.3496
3.26e+31
4.79e+75
1.39e+33
2.05e+77
0
0
5.95e+34
8.74e+78
I/UNI
Without Time Fixed Effects With Time Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
0.2831
0.2836
3.97e+41
1.66e+19
1.74e+43
7.29e+20
0
0
7.62e+44
3.19e+22

Thus, as expected, buyers seem to weight the backlogging cost (about 3.5 times)
more than the inventory holding cost under this treatment. On the other hand, the
estimated γit value under the NI/UNI treatment relies heavily on whether the time
fixed effects are controlled for, which alludes to the significance of the learning effect
over time for the case without information, as discussed before. In particular, the γit
value gets very close to the true value with the time fixed effects. Overall, when the
buyers do not have information about the allocation policy, they seem to be putting
more weight on the inventory holding cost compared to the case with information,
which is in line with our observations from Table 4.3, where the coefficient for onhand inventory under NI/UNI is relatively higher than that under I/UNI.
We next present histograms of γit for both treatments in Figure 4.2. These histograms show similar patterns as in the structural estimation modeling literature
(Olivares et al., 2008), and a substantial heterogeneity in the estimated cost ratios.
We also provide the histograms of log-transformed γit , i.e., ln (γit ), in Figure 4.3.19
19

Note that the numbers of observations are different under the two treatments (1,824 under
NI/UNI and 1,920 under I/UNI). We also exclude the extreme γit values for better visibility.
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Since γit values seem to follow a log-normal distribution, we use ln (γit ) for further analysis. In addition, as the estimated cost ratios contain extreme values (i.e.,
γit ≥10,000), particularly under NI/UNI treatment, we provide subsequent results
for both models with and without extreme values.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of ln (γit ) - All Periods
To understand the source of the heterogeneity in the γit values, we examine how a
buyer’s cost ratio, ln(γit ), is affected by factors such as her on-hand inventory, backlog
level, on-order quantity, received shipment, and realized demand. To control for pairlevel fixed effects, we conduct clustered fixed-effect regressions at the buyer-pair level.
For all models, Hausman tests strongly reject the null hypothesis, indicating that
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fixed-effects models are more appropriate than random-effects models, and thus, for
both treatments, the results from fixed-effects models are shown in Table 4.6.20
Table 4.6: Clustered Regressions of ln (γit ) - All Periods with Time Fixed Effects
ln (γit )
NI/UNI
I/UNI
All Observations Without Extremes All Observations Without Extremes
Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2
Ni,t−1
Ri,t−1
Di,t−1

-0.114***
(0.01)
0.131***
(0.02)
-0.0640***
(0.01)
-0.140***
(0.01)
0.123***
(0.01)

-0.0842***
(0.01)
0.0649***
(0.01)
-0.0424***
(0.00)
-0.0855***
(0.01)
0.0720***
(0.01)

N
1,708
1,454
R2
0.639
0.669
38
38
# buyers
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

-0.0838***
(0.01)
0.0597***
(0.01)
-0.0176*
(0.01)
-0.0999***
(0.01)
0.104***
(0.01)

-0.0747***
(0.01)
0.0490***
(0.01)
-0.0122
(0.01)
-0.0836***
(0.01)
0.0755***
(0.01)

1,805
0.700
40

1,621
0.658
40

The coefficients of the independent variables show consistent signs across all regressions. The coefficient of on-hand inventory, Ii,t−2 , is significantly negative under
both NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments, indicating that the buyers with lower on-hand
inventory levels tend to have higher γit values (i.e., put more weight on inventory
holding cost in comparison to backlogging cost).21 Moreover, when information on
allocation policy is not communicated to the buyers, they tend to place a higher weight
on the inventory holding cost, as compared to the case with information, particularly
20

Note that Table 4.6 provides the results from regression models with time fixed effects controlled. We also provide the results without time fixed effects in Table B.1 in Chapter 4 Appendices.
21

Including all observations, the coefficient of on-hand inventory under NI/UNI treatment is
statistically significantly greater than that under I/UNI treatment (z-statistic 2.69 > z-critical
2.58, at α = 0.01 level), while excluding extreme values, the difference is not statistically significant
(z-statistic 0.883 < z-critical 1.65, at α = 0.1 level).
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when the extreme values are included (which primarily occur in the first half of the
game, as will be explained below). On the contrary, the coefficient of backlog, Bi,t−2 ,
shows a significantly positive relationship under both treatments, indicating that the
buyers with lower backlog levels tend to have lower γit values (i.e, put more weight on
backlogging cost relative to inventory holding cost).22 Moreover, when information
on the supplier’s allocation policy is not communicated, the buyers are more sensitive
to their backlog levels, particularly under extreme values.
We also observe that the coefficient for on-order quantity, Ni,t−1 , is negatively
significant under NI/UNI treatment, while insignificant (or marginally significant23
with a very small coefficient) under I/UNI treatment. Moreover, the difference
between the two treatments is statistically significant, where on-order quantity influences buyers’ perceived cost ratios more when information on the allocation policy is
not communicated.24 Thus, a higher on-order quantity tends to influence the buyers’
perceived cost ratios more, emphasizing the backlogging cost, when buyers do not have
any information on the allocation policy.
Overall, the magnitudes of the coefficients under NI/UNI seem to be larger
than those under I/UNI, which indicates that when buyers do not have information
on the supplier’s allocation policy, they may act in a more reactive fashion, since
their perceived cost ratios are more influenced by their current state, such as on-hand
inventory, backlog, and on-order quantity levels.
As our results tend to change based on the inclusion/exclusion of extreme values,
we further examine the variability of γit values. To understand where the extreme
22

With all observations, the coefficient of backlog under NI/UNI treatment is statistically significantly greater than that under I/UNI treatment (z-statistic 4.17 > z-critical 2.58, at α = 0.01
level), while excluding extreme values, the difference is not statistically significant (z-statistic 1.43
< z-critical 1.65, at α = 0.1 level).
23

Significant at α = 0.1 level.

24

With all observations, z-statistic is 3.85, and excluding extreme values, 3.42. Both are greater
than z-critical, 2.58, at α = 0.01 level.
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values are mostly observed, we first calculate the mean γit for each individual. Under
NI/UNI, the extreme values (around 99% percentile) are observed in five subjects25
out of 38, while under I/UNI, an extreme value is observed in only one subject 26 out
of 40. We next calculate the mean γit for each period. Under NI/UNI, the extreme
values are observed in periods 1, 2, 3, 23, 24, 25, while under I/UNI, extreme values
are observed in periods 1, 2, 7. As extreme values appear in the first half of the
game, it seems that the second half of the game represents more stable decisions
as discussed before. Therefore, in the following section, we conduct the structural
estimation analysis concentrating on the second half of the game.27
Buyers’ Perceived Cost Ratios - Second Half of the Game

In this section, we concentrate on the second half of the game (i.e., periods 26-50).
Consistent with the all-periods analysis, through standard and robust Hausman tests,
we validate that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the random-effects
model for estimating the buyers’ perceived cost ratio, γit . In addition, the R2 value
significantly improves when the time fixed effects are controlled for, which holds for
both I/UNI and NI/UNI treatments. Therefore, we again refer to the γit values
obtained through fixed-effects regressions with time fixed effects. Summary statistics
of γit are provided in Table 4.7.
Although the magnitudes of the coefficients are reduced in comparison with those
in the all-periods analysis, we observe in Table 4.7 that the mean and standard
deviation of γit are again large due to extreme values. Thus, we refer to the median
values for our analysis.
25

Subject are A3B1, A5B2, A7B1, A50B1, A50B2.

26

Subject is E11B2.

27

We also test for multicollinearity for all four models under both treatments. We find that the
maximum VIF across all four models is 2.76, which does not exceed the rule of thumb 10 (Kutner
et al., 2004), while the four mean VIF values range from 1.98 to 2.40, which indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in these models.
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics of γit - 2nd Half

Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

NI/UNI
Without Time Fixed Effects With Time Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
0.1654
0.1248
1.92e+10
2.10e+19
4.78e+11
6.46e+20
0
0
1.42e+13
1.99e+22
I/UNI
Without Time Fixed Effects With Time Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
0.1491
0.0914
30403.82
1.26e+08
846475
2.85e+09
0
0
2.65e+07
8.05e+10

Under both NI/UNI and I/UNI, we observe that the median γit in the secondhalf of the game significantly decreases in comparison to the all-periods case, while the
gap between the two treatments decrease in the second half of the game as decisions
stabilize. In particular, the median value decreases from 0.2836 to 0.0914 under
I/UNI, and from 0.3496 to 0.1248 under NI/UNI, which are both considerably
smaller than the true value, 31 . Thus, buyers seem to emphasize the backlogging cost
significantly more in the second-half of the game.
We next present histograms of γit for both treatments in Figure 4.4, which show
similar patterns as in the all-periods case, as well as a substantial heterogeneity in
the estimated cost ratios. We also provide histograms of the log-transformed γit , i.e.,
ln (γit ), in Figure 4.5.28 Although each log-transformed graph shows a slight left shift
in comparison to the graphs in the all-periods analysis, the γit values still seem to
follow an approximately log-normal distribution. Therefore, we use ln (γit ) for further
analysis, to maintain consistency with the all-periods analysis.
28

Note that the number of observations is different under the two treatments (950 under NI/UNI
and 1,000 under I/UNI). We exclude the extreme γit values for better visibility.
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To understand the source of the heterogeneity in the γit values, we investigate how
a buyer’s cost ratio is influenced by the factors considered in the all-periods analysis.
Since no extreme γit values29 are observed in the second half of the game, we do not
exclude any observations for this analysis. To control for the pair-level fixed effects,
we conduct clustered fixed-effects regressions at the buyer-pair level, and present the
results controlling for the time fixed effects.30 The results are provided in Table 4.8.
29

Based on the mean values for each individual and/or for each period.

30

Consistent with our observations in the all-periods analysis, for all models, Hausman tests
strongly reject the null hypothesis, indicating that fixed-effects models are more appropriate than
random-effects models. Therefore, for both NI/UNI and I/UNI treatments, we report the results
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Table 4.8: Clustered Regressions of ln (γit ) - 2nd Half with Time Fixed Effects
ln (γit )

Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2
Ni,t−1
Ri,t−1
Di,t−1

NI/UNI
All Observations

I/UNI
All Observations

-0.0939***
(0.01)
0.0799***
(0.01)
-0.0410***
(0.01)
-0.110***
(0.01)
0.104***
(0.01)

-0.0772***
(0.01)
0.0737***
(0.01)
-0.0534***
(0.01)
-0.0936***
(0.01)
0.0993***
(0.01)

N
897
960
R2
0.640
0.740
38
40
# buyers
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Overall, the signs of the coefficients are consistent with those in the all-periods
analysis. We observe that the differences in the coefficients between NI/UNI and
I/UNI become insignificant in the second half of the game, which is expected due to
learning over time and the system reaching steady-state.31 Thus, consistent with our
observations for supply line underweighting, communication on the allocation policy
significantly influences the buyers’ perceived cost ratios in the initial periods, while
the influence is reduced over time due to learning.32
from fixed-effects models. We also focus on the models with time fixed effects. We provide the
results from the models without time fixed effects in Table B.2 in Chapter 4 Appendices.
31

The differences in the coefficients are not statistically significant for on-hand inventory, backlog,
on-order quantity, and demand (with z-statistics 1.60, 0.54, 1.08, 0.31, respectively) and marginally
significant for received shipment (with z-value of 1.73), in comparison to the z-critical, 1.65, at
α = 0.1 level.
32

We also test for multi-collinearity for all four models in Table 4.8. We find that the maximum
VIF for each model are 2.95 and 2.76, with mean VIF values of 2.07 and 2.08. As both maximum
VIF values are considerably smaller than the rule of thumb of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004), we conclude
that multi-collinearity is not a serious problem in these models.
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4.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we investigated buyers’ ordering behavior under inventory competition for the limited capacity of a single supplier. We assumed that the supplier
uses uniform allocation when the sum of the orders exceeds his available inventory.
While most analytical studies based on economic theory and many empirical studies
assume rational buyers who make optimal decisions, findings in behavioral literature
find evidence of suboptimal decision making. For a closer examination of the buyer
ordering behavior, we first compared the theoretical benchmark obtained from the
simulations in the previous chapter with the actual buyer ordering decisions from our
behavioral study. We found that the profit performances of buyers are significantly
lower than the theoretical benchmark in the range of 0.8% to 14.1%.
To understand the buyer behavior better, we tested one of the observations reported in the literature, the supply line underweighting, using maximum likelihood
estimation techniques. We showed that buyers underweight the supply line even
when information on the allocation policy is communicated. We also showed that the
effects of the state factors such as previous demand and inventory level (except for
on-order quantity) are generally larger, when information on the allocation policy is
not communicated. However, as the buyers’ base-stock levels stabilize over time due
to learning, the differences due to communication decrease.
In addition, using structural estimation modeling techniques, we estimated the
buyers’ perceived overage/underage cost ratios from the experiments. As compared
to the true ratio of 31 , the estimated ratio under uniform allocation policy was 0.2836
with information and 0.3496 without information. Thus, the cost ratio with information disclosure seems to be slightly smaller than the original value (i.e., putting
slightly more weight on the backlogging cost and less weight on the inventory holding
cost), while without information disclosure slightly larger than the true value (i.e.,
putting relatively more weight on the inventory holding cost and less weight on the
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backlogging cost). We further examined the effect of various state factors on this
cost ratio. Consistent with the findings for supply line underweighting, our analyses
showed that when information on the allocation policy is not disclosed, the effect of
the state factors on the perceived cost ratios is generally larger than the case with
information. However, the differences in the coefficients between with vs. without
information cases decrease over time.
As a future research direction, one can investigate whether information on the
supplier’s production policy can further change the buyers’ ordering behavior (i.e.,
when buyers are also informed about the supplier’s base-stock policy). Another future research direction is to develop behavioral models by incorporating the concept
of psychological costs of overage and underage similar to Ho et al. (2010), and/or
by considering the anchor selection models for decision-making (Gavirneni and Xia,
2009). Some potential anchors that could be considered are: (1) mean demand (i.e.,
mean demand anchoring tendency shown in Schweitzer and Cachon (2000)), (2) order forecast (i.e., soft orders that the buyer shares in advance), and (3) the optimal
base-stock ordering level under 100% fill rate (i.e., with a fully reliable supplier).
Finally, while we assumed independent market demand for each buyer (i.e., no
end-customer market competition) and a constant retail price (i.e., buyers as price
takers), future research may consider demand competition between two buyers in
the same end-customer market. As shown in analytical OM literature that demand
competition may change the truth-inducing effect of uniform allocation on orders (Liu,
2012; Cho and Tang, 2014), while to the best of our knowledge, uniform allocation
under demand competition has not been yet empirically studied, particularly in a
behavioral context.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we investigated the buyers’ forecasting and ordering behavior in
a two-stage supply chain, particularly in the context of different capacity allocation
policies and information disclosures of a supplier, using a behavioral framework.
In Chapter 2, we focused on the buyers’ order forecast sharing behavior under different capacity allocation policies and information disclosures from the supplier. Our
behavioral study showed that our proposed allocation policy, forecast accuracy based
allocation, improves the accuracy of order forecasts submitted by the buyers, in comparison to uniform allocation, even without information disclosure on the allocation
policy. The results also show that the order forecast accuracy further improves under
both allocation policies, when the supplier allocation information is communicated
to the buyers, which is more pronounced for uniform allocation. Our results also suggest that even without contractual obligations (which is mostly the case in practical
settings such as semiconductor manufacturing), the buyers’ forecast accuracy can be
improved if the supplier rewards forecast accuracy in allocating inventory.
In the rest of the dissertation, we focused on the buyers’ ordering behavior under
uniform allocation. We first characterized a buyer’s (static) optimal base stock level
using analytical and numerical simulation approaches in Chapter 3. We then used
the simulation results as a theoretical benchmark to compare against the buyer behavior observed in behavioral experiments in Chapter 4. Our results show that profit
performances of buyers in the experiments are significantly lower than those of the
simulated buyers in the range of 0.8% to 14.1%.
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We then looked into the potential supply line underweighting of buyers, which
is one of the behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect. Our results using maximum
likelihood estimation showed that buyers underweight the supply line even when
information on the allocation policy is communicated. We also found that in the
initial periods, buyers tend to rely more on the previous period’s demand when the
supplier does not communicate his allocation policy to the buyers. However, as the
decisions stabilize over time, the impact of communication on the various factors that
affect buyers’ ordering behavior becomes negligible.
To understand the buyers’ ordering behavior better, we also looked into the perceived overage/underage cost ratios using structural estimation modeling techniques.
Our results showed that buyers use inventory holding to backlog cost ratios quite
close to the true value of the ratio, although they tend to emphasize the inventory
holding cost more when they do not have any information on the allocation policy. In
contrast, in the second half of the game, buyers tend to emphasize backlogging cost
more than the inventory holding cost regardless of the information about the allocation policy. On the other hand, the effect of various state factors on the perceived
cost ratios are generally larger when the information on the allocation policy is not
communicated. Similar to our findings on supply line underweighting, we find that
the impact of communication becomes negligible over time.
In this dissertation, in addition to academic contributions, our results provide
insights for practitioners to understand buyers’ strategic forecast sharing and ordering
behavior and help with designing capacity allocation strategies.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendices
A.1

Outlier Analysis

For the statistical analysis of experiments, we removed “singles,” i.e., subjects for
which their partner’s data could not be collected due to technical issues. We also
removed two pairs from 1, where one subject in each pair submitted consistently
high order forecasts (5000 in one pair and 500-1000 in the other pair) for several
periods causing high forecast inflation, not to bias our findings. This does not affect
our findings in general, except for making the results on Hypotheses 1-2 stronger.
We used the average profit that the subjects made during the game as the main
criterion for outlier detection since we observed a relatively tight profit range across
subjects, particularly in the second half of the game. We utilized the minimum
covariance determinant (MCD) estimator with 2.5% trimming (Verardi and Dehon,
2010). Table A.1 gives the list of the outlier subjects, and the average profit they made
in each half of the game as well as across 50 periods (game profit). We identified three
subjects (one each from 1, 3, 4) that met our criterion in both the first and second
halves of the game. We removed the pairs of these subjects from the analysis of both
halves of the game (marked with “X” in Table A.1). We identified three additional
subjects (one each from 1, 2, and 3) that qualified as outliers for only the first half
of the game (marked with “Y” in Table A.1), so we excluded their pairs from the
first half analysis not to bias the results. We present the average profit by subject
after X and Y outliers are removed in Table A.2. We can see that the outliers that
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were removed from the first half analysis (Y) do not have a significant effect on the
average profit in the second half and thus, we included them in the dataset for the
second half analysis (our results continued to hold excluding them).
Finally, we identified periods with very high/low orders, which could bias mean
forecast accuracy metrics by subject and pair. MCD estimator with 2.5% trimming
detected the low (high) cutoff point for order quantity across 50 periods as 74 (340).
This removed 95 (2.5%) observations from the second half of the game and 226 (5.9%)
observations from the first half (the count of observations for the first half is before the
“Y” outliers were removed). For robustness checks, we conducted all statistical tests
once again including those outliers and we only spotted two changes in our results.
The first change was observed for the forecast inflation difference between 2 vs. 4,
which was no longer significant (p > 0.1) at either subject or pair level. The second
change was for the forecast error difference between 1 vs. 3, which became significant
(p = 0.085) only at the pair level. However, the rest of the results continued to hold.
Table A.1: Analysis of Outliers by Average Profit
Treatment Subject Avg.
Avg.
st
nd
ID
1 half 2 half
profit
profit
1
A5B2
127.23
187.63
1
A60B1
137.77
96.82
2
B7B2
60.90
194.90
3
E16B2
53.67
101.40
3
E19B2
88.73
180.33
4
D57B2
144.73
66.70

A.2

Avg.
game
profit
157.43
117.29
127.90
77.54
134.53
105.72

Removed Removed
from all from 1st
analysis half only
Y
X
Y
X
Y
X

Mann-Whitney Test Results for Order Forecast Accuracy
Metrics

In this appendix, we present the full set of statistical (MW) test results at both subject
and pair levels for all forecast accuracy metrics discussed in Section 2.4.2. In Table
A.3, z-stat represents the MW test statistic, p-value is the statistical significance level
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Table A.2: Average Profit across Subjects after Outliers are Removed
After removing the X outliers:
1st Half
N M ean S.D.
M in
M ax
156 176.37 16.09 60.90 195.12
After removing the Y outliers:
1st Half
N M ean S.D.
M in
M ax
150 178.06 10.27 145.72 195.12

2nd Half
M ean S.D. M in
187.12 6.43 162.68

M ax
200.04

2nd Half
M ean S.D. M in
187.24 6.32 162.68

M ax
200.04

and p-order is the probability that a randomly selected subject from the first group
(the left of “>”) has a higher forecast inflation/error than a randomly selected subject
from the second group (the right of “>”). The notation “13/24/12/34” represents
the pooled dataset of subjects from two treatments: 13 > 24 investigates the effect of
the implementation of an allocation policy regardless of whether the allocation policy
is communicated or not, and 12 > 34 investigates the effect of the communication of
an allocation policy regardless of the allocation policy in effect. The bold entries are
statistically significant at 0.1 level.
As it can be seen from this table, the tests are generally consistent at both levels.
The only difference in the pairwise comparisons arises for mean absolute forecast error
for 2 vs. 4. While the statistical significance does not qualify at the 0.1 level at the
subject level, the result is still significant at the pair level (p = 0.0373). However, the
difference between 2 vs. 3 is not statistically significant at the subject or pair level
for any of the forecast accuracy metrics.
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Table A.3: MW Test Results for Order Forecast Accuracy Metrics

Base forecast inflation (base_inf )
13>24
12>34
1>2
1>4
1>3
2>4
2>3
3>4
Mean
forecast
inflation (m_inf )
13>24
12>34
1>2
1>4
1>3
2>4
2>3
3>4
Mean
forecast
error (m_fe)
13>24
12>34
1>2
1>4
1>3
2>4
2>3
3>4
Mean absolute
forecast
error
(ma_fe)
13>24
12>34
1>2
1>4
1>3
2>4
2>3
3>4

Mean by subject
z-stat p-value p-order

Mean by pair
z-stat p-value p-order

2.740
1.245
1.675
2.680
1.041
1.011
-1.073
2.335

0.0062
0.2132
0.0939
0.0074
0.2980
0.3123
0.2832
0.0195

0.627
0.558
0.612
0.679
0.569
0.566
0.430
0.652

3.259
1.879
1.900
3.654
1.374
1.325
-0.893
2.786

0.0011
0.0602
0.0574
0.0003
0.1694
0.1850
0.3720
0.0053

0.714
0.624
0.681
0.847
0.631
0.623
0.417
0.757

2.831
2.507
2.231
3.761
2.070
1.665
-0.255
1.886

0.0046
0.0122
0.0256
0.0002
0.0384
0.0960
0.7987
0.0593

0.631
0.616
0.649
0.751
0.638
0.608
0.483
0.623

2.799
2.589
1.842
3.684
2.046
1.812
-0.108
2.353

0.0051
0.0096
0.0655
0.0002
0.0407
0.0699
0.9138
0.0186

0.684
0.670
0.675
0.850
0.694
0.667
0.490
0.718

3.097
1.564
1.717
3.085
1.020
1.578
-1.131
2.834

0.0020
0.1179
0.0861
0.0020
0.3080
0.1145
0.2582
0.0046

0.644
0.573
0.615
0.706
0.568
0.603
0.427
0.684

3.209
1.529
1.754
3.274
1.082
1.298
-1.190
2.840

0.0013
0.1261
0.0794
0.0011
0.2794
0.1941
0.2340
0.0045

0.711
0.601
0.667
0.811
0.603
0.620
0.390
0.762

1.876
2.399
1.592
2.986
2.257
1.386
0.274
1.131

0.0607
0.0165
0.1115
0.0028
0.0240
0.1658
0.7839
0.2582
100

0.587
0.611
0.606
0.699
0.651
0.590
0.518
0.573

1.579
2.829
1.052
3.040
2.193
2.083
0.730
1.217

0.1142
0.0047
0.2926
0.0024
0.0283
0.0373
0.4652
0.2235

0.604
0.686
0.600
0.789
0.708
0.693
0.568
0.613

A.3

Analysis of the First Half of the Game

In this section, we provide our analysis for the first 25 periods of the game. Table A.4
gives the design matrix with updated number of subjects (N = 150), after excluding
the outliers for the first half analysis:
Table A.4: Experimental Design
Implementation
Information
NI
I

UNI
1 (34)
3 (38)

FCT
2 (38)
4 (40)

Descriptive statistics on the order quantity, forecast, and forecast accuracy metrics
by treatment are given in Table A.5. We observe that the order quantities in the first
half of the game are higher compared to the second half, but are still similar across
treatments. The median order forecasts and base forecast inflation are relatively
higher in the first half of the game for all treatments except 1, where there is no
significant change over the course of the game. Order forecasts are again statistically
significantly higher than the mean of the consumer demand distribution, 200 (p <
0.001). Analyzing the forecast error with respect to firm orders closely, we observe
over-reporting behavior in 56% of the subjects (m_f e > 0, M ean = 10.7, S.D. =
10.6), and under-reporting behavior in 44% of the subjects (m_f e < 0, M ean =
−10.6, S.D. = 9.5). Thus, while order forecast inflation is still persistent in the first
half, we find that negative errors are of a higher concern than the second half (recall
83% vs. 17%). This is not surprising as subjects may be exploring the effects of their
orders and forecasts in the early phases of the game. However, it is interesting to see
that the tendency moves towards inflation in the second half once the game stabilizes.
We next compare the order forecast accuracy metrics by treatment. We use the
nonparametric MW test for all our statistical comparisons at the subject level unless
otherwise stated.
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Table A.5: The Effect of Allocation Policy on Buyers’ Order Forecast Accuracy (1st half)
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NI/UNI

NI/FCT

I/UNI

I/FCT

1

2

3

4

N

34

38

38

40

Ō

210.1 (9.6) [207.7]

211.9 (12.1) [209.8]

210.1 (8.6) [207.9]

210.7 (8.3) [207.5]

F̄

214.8 (16.3) [210.8]

213.2 (17.5) [211.0]

213.4 (12.1) [212.7]

207.3 (6.8) [206.0]

base_inf

7% (8%) [5%]

7% (9%) [5%]

7% (6%) [6%]

4% (3%) [3%]

m_f e

4.7 (17.1) [1.8]

1.3 (16.8) [1.5]

3.3 (13.5) [2.8]

-3.4 (9.7) [-1.4]

ma_f e

46.5 (16.8) [44.2]

43.8 (16.6) [44.0]

39.5 (15.2) [37.8]

36.6 (16.6) [38.5]

m_inf

25.6 (13.0) [20.6]

22.5 (11.7) [20.0]

21.4 (10.9) [17.9]

16.6 (8.6) [16.0]

Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Median values are given in brackets. Ō is the average
order quantity and F̄ is the average order forecast across subjects.

• The mean order forecast error/bias (m_f e) under 4 is statistically significantly
lower than other treatments.1 Interestingly, in contrast to the positive bias that
we observed in the second half of the game, we see a negative bias under 4 in
the first half. We compare the absolute value of this bias to understand whether
it is statistically lower in magnitude than other treatments, which we confirm
against the UNI treatments (p < 0.05). Thus, even though we observe predominantly under-reporting behavior in the first half of the game when FCT
is implemented with communication, the order forecast error is still lower in
magnitude than UNI treatments.
• The mean absolute order forecast error (ma_f e) is reduced for both FCT and
UNI when implemented with communication (p < 0.1). Similar to the second
half results, the difference between 3 vs. 4 is not statistically significant.
• When FCT is implemented with communication (4), the mean order forecast
inflation (m_inf ) is reduced compared to all other treatments.2
• Similar to the second half results, although 4 dominates over 1 in mean order
forecast error, absolute error and inflation (p < 0.05), the difference between
2 vs. 3 is not statistically significant at 0.1 level for any forecast accuracy
metrics. That is, UNI with communication seems to have similar performance
with FCT without communication also in the first half of the game.
In summary, our analysis from the first half of the game also confirms that buyers’
order forecast accuracy can be improved when FCT is implemented with communication. In particular, the most significant reduction in order forecast inflation and
bias is observed under 4 against other treatments. That is, communication is critical
1

For 1 vs. 4 and 3 vs. 4, p < 0.05. For 2 vs. 4, p < 0.10 (0.05) at the subject (pair) level.

2

1 vs. 4, p = 0.004; 2 vs. 4, p = 0.025; 3 vs. 4, p = 0.089.
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for FCT to be effective, particularly in the first half of the game. This is intuitive as
subjects would be more motivated to submit accurate order forecasts from the start
if they are informed about the rewarding mechanism.

A.4

List of Experiment Sessions

Table A.6 presents the list of experiment sessions that we conducted to collect our
dataset. Each cell gives the number of subjects that played in a particular treatment
in each session (after singles/outliers are removed as described in Appendix A.1).
Note that all sessions in 2011 and later were administered by the same experimenter.
Thus, while the data was collected over multiple sessions, we do not expect any bias in
the subjects’ understanding of the game due to experimenter differences in presenting
the instructions.
Table A.6: List of Experiment Sessions
Sep-Nov 2009
UNI FCT
NI
10
I
10/14/2011
UNI FCT
NI
2
2
I
4
4/25/2014
UNI FCT
NI
4
I
6
11/30/2015
UNI FCT
NI
6
6
I
2/26/2016
UNI FCT
NI
4
I
4

Apr-Nov 2010
UNI FCT
NI
18
I
4
4/10/2013
UNI FCT
NI
I
6
5/2/2014
UNI FCT
NI
2
I
2
12/4/2015
UNI FCT
NI
I
4
3/4/2016
UNI FCT
NI
6
6
I
6
8
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9/28/2011
UNI FCT
NI
2
I
6
4/18/2014
UNI FCT
NI
I
4
5/12/2014
UNI FCT
NI
I
8
12/9/2015
UNI FCT
NI
I
4
4
3/25/2016
UNI FCT
NI
4
4
I
10

A.5

Simulation Game Screenshots

The main game screen for each buyer displays the state of the system at the beginning
of the current period, right before placing an order. The player can enter the order for
the current period, revise the existing forecasts for the next three periods and enter a
new forecast for the fourth period in the future (rolling horizon forecasting). Various
key metrics are displayed to help with the decision making process. These include
performance measures such as the average per period profit, supplier’s overall fill
rate, the buyer’s overall service level to consumers, exponentially smoothed forecast
accuracy, as well as metrics to help with understanding the system state at the end
of the previous period such as received shipment from the supplier, realized consumer
demand, on-order quantity which the supplier has yet to send in future periods,
ending inventory, and backlog levels. The player can click on the ‘Parameters’ tab
to view the revenue/cost parameters, ‘Financials’ tab to see a detailed history of key
metrics, ‘Forecast History’ tab to see a history of forecasts and the associated forecast
accuracy, ‘Graphical Display’ tab to see a graphical representation of key metrics over

Game Interface

time, and the ‘Comments’ tab to enter any comments during the game.

Figure A.1: Buyer Main Screen
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3

Financials Screen displays a detailed history of the key metrics up to the current
period. For each period, these metrics include the profit, service level to consumers,
realized consumer demand, sales quantity, the amount ordered and received from the
supplier, supplier’s fill rate, the ending inventory, and backlog levels.

Figure A.2: Buyer Financials Screen
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4

Graphical Display Screen displays a graphical representation of key metrics
over time up to the current period. The player can select which metrics to display.

Figure A.3: Buyer Graphical Display Screen

6
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Forecast History Screen provides a detailed history of the forecasts, orders, and
associated exponentially smoothed forecast accuracy up to the current period. As an
example of the forecast accuracy computations in Chapter 2, the ‘Accuracy’ numbers
for each period that appear in the Forecast History screen in Figure A.4 correspond
to f ait , while the ‘Exponentially Smoothed Average’ number, 80.7%, corresponds to
F Ait as of period 30. The latter number also appears in the Buyer Main screen as it
can be seen in Figure A.1.

5

Figure A.4: Buyer Forecast History Screen
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A.6

Simulation Game Session Player Quiz

After we provided the necessary background information about the supply chain game
to the players at the beginning of each game session, and showed the game screens
presented in the previous section, we gave them a verbal quiz (see Figure A.5). Only
after we received the correct answers and clarified their questions, we started the
game session. For example, we explained that the consumer demand that a buyer
faced was normally distributed with a mean of 200 and a standard deviation of 40.
In the quiz, we ensured that they understood that there was no correlation between
consecutive demand realizations, and the demand they faced was independent from
their partner’s.
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Quiz
1.

You play with the same partner (competitor) throughout the experiment?

2.

Both you and your competitor purchase from the same supplier?

3.

The supplier is played by a computer?

4.

The amount of products you receive from the supplier in a period could be affected by the
order that your competitor places with the supplier in the same period?

5.

How is your profit calculated in each period?

6.

Suppose the demands that you had in the first 5 periods were 210, 220, 230, 240, and 250
respectively. What is the demand for the 6th period going to be?

Quiz (Cont’d)
Suppose you order 100 units in
period 31 and received 105 units.
The demand for period 31 turns out
to be 200.

8

What are the values of the
following fields at the beginning of
period 32?
•
•
•
•
•

Received shipment
Demand
On Order
Inventory
Backlog

Figure A.5: Preliminary Game Quiz
9
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Appendix B
Chapter 4 Appendices
B.1

Summary of Results without Time Fixed Effects

We provide the results without time fixed effect controlled in Table B.1 below.
Table B.1: Clustered Regressions of ln (γit ) under NI/UNI and I/UNI - All Periods
without Time Fixed Effects
ln (γit )
NI/UNI
I/UNI
All Observations Without Extremes All Observations Without Extremes
Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2
Ni,t−1
Ri,t−1
Di,t−1

-0.133***
(0.01)
0.151***
(0.02)
-0.0497***
(0.01)
-0.148***
(0.01)
0.186***
(0.01)

-0.0968***
(0.01)
0.0769***
(0.01)
-0.0345***
(0.00)
-0.0900***
(0.01)
0.132***
(0.01)

N
1,708
1,454
2
R
0.571
0.562
# buyers
38
38
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

-0.103***
(0.01)
0.0867***
(0.01)
-0.0134*
(0.01)
-0.113***
(0.01)
0.166***
(0.01)

-0.0840***
(0.01)
0.0639***
(0.01)
-0.0116*
(0.01)
-0.0885***
(0.01)
0.133***
(0.01)

1,805
0.610
40

1,621
0.559
40

As in Chapter 4, we compared the coefficients of the independent variables using
z-tests, and obtained similar results. With all observations, the differences in the
coefficients of on-hand inventory, backlog, on-order quantity, received shipment, and
demand are all statistically significant (with z-statistics of 2.70, 4.28, 3.73, 2.29, 2.25,
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respectively), in comparison to the z-critical, 1.96, at α = 0.05 level. On the other
hand, without extreme values, the differences in the coefficients of on-hand inventory,
backlog, received shipment, and demand become insignificant, while the difference in
the coefficients of on-order quantity remained statistically significant.
We also show the results from analysis with the 2nd half periods in Table B.2.
Table B.2: Clustered Regressions of ln (γit ) under NI/UNI and I/UNI - 2nd Half
without Time Fixed Effects
ln (γit )
NI/UNI
I/UNI
All Observations All Observations
Ii,t−2
Bi,t−2
Ni,t−1
Ri,t−1
Di,t−1

-0.105***
(0.01)
0.0772***
(0.01)
-0.0363***
(0.01)
-0.105***
(0.01)
0.152***
(0.01)

-0.0971***
(0.01)
0.0785***
(0.01)
-0.0442***
(0.01)
-0.0971***
(0.01)
0.157***
(0.01)

N
897
960
2
R
0.560
0.635
# buyers
38
40
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Similar to the results in Chapter 4, the differences in the coefficients of on-hand
inventory, backlog, on-order quantity, received shipment, and demand are not statistically significant (with z-statistics of 0.82, 0.10, 0.80, 0.86, 0.45, respectively), in
comparison to the z-critical, 1.65, at α = 0.1 level.
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